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NEUROSCIENCE, JUSTICE AND THE “MENTAL
CAUSATION” FALLACY
JOHN A. HUMBACH*
All actions take place in time by the
interweaving of the forces of Nature; but
the man lost in selfish delusion thinks that
he himself is the actor.1
ABSTRACT
Mental causation is a foundational assumption of modern criminal
justice. The law takes it for granted that wrongdoers “deserve”
punishment because their acts are caused by intentions, reasons and other
mental states. A growing body of neuroscience evidence shows, however,
that human behavior is produced by observable physiological activity in
the brain and central nervous system—all in accordance with ordinary
physical laws. Beyond these ordinary physiological interactions and
processes, no hypothesis of mental causation is required to causally
explain behavior.
Despite the evidence, neuroskeptics insist that intentions, reasons and
other mental states can play a causal role in producing human behavior.
The evidentiary case for mental causation turns out, however, to be
premised on a well-known logical fallacy, post hoc ergo propter hoc.

*
Professor of Law, Elisabeth Haub School of Law at Pace University.
Note to Readers: It should generally not be necessary to read the footnotes, sometimes lengthy, in
order to follow the main points of this article. They are meant mainly as supplementation and as a
place to comment on technical issues that may be of interest to some but a distraction from the main
flow for others.
1.
BHAGAVAD GITA 3:27–28 (Juan Mascaró, trans. 1962) (c. 500 B.C.).
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Meanwhile, based on the best explanation of all the evidence and data,
mental causation almost certainly cannot and does not occur.
If mental causation is the basis on which offenders are deemed to
deserve punishment, current punishment practices may need to be revised
in the interest of justice. While society will probably always need to use
coercive measures against persons who pose intolerable dangers and
risks, the nature and quality of those measures may be very different if
they are treated as a regrettable necessities rather than as deserved.
INTRODUCTION
The idea that mental states such as intentions and reasons can cause or
influence human behavior is thickly woven into criminal law. The
multiplicity and substantive importance of legally relevant mental states
(intention, purpose, volition, etc.), each having its own particular
significance in assessing guilt,2 leaves no doubt that modern conceptions
of justice are deeply dependent on the “folk psychology” assumption that
wrongful acts are the products of culpable minds.3 In sharp distinction to
most of the law’s assumptions about the world, however, the putative
causal efficacy of mental states does not even purport to be based on
known facts about physical reality.
In recent decades, a growing body of neuroscience research has
developed an alternative causal explanation of how human behavior is
produced.4 According to this newer explanation, the things that people do
are caused by their brains, not by their minds or mental states.5 The newer

2. See generally JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 117–44 (6th ed. 2012);
Wayne R. LaFave, CRIMINAL LAW 252–88 (5th ed. 2010),
3. See Stephen J. Morse, The Inevitable Mind in the Age of Neuroscience 34, in PHILOSOPHICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF LAW AND NEUROSCIENCE (Patterson et al. eds., 2016) [hereinafter Morse, Inevitable
Mind]; Stephen J. Morse, Determinism and the Death of Folk Psychology: Two Challenges To
Responsibility from Neuroscience, 9 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 1, 2–3, 10–11 (2008) [hereinafter Morse,
Folk Psychology] (“Roughly speaking, the law implicitly adopts the folk-psychological model of the
person, which explains behavior in terms of desires, beliefs and intentions.”); Stephen J. Morse, Lost
in Translation: An Essay on Law and Neuroscience 530 (2011), in LAW AND NEUROSCIENCE (Michael
Freedman, ed. 2011) [hereinafter Morse, Translation].
4. A study conducted by Elsevier found that 1.79 million articles were published in the area of
brain and neuroscience research during the period 2009 to 2013. Georgin Lau et al., New Report Maps
The Landscape Of Global Brain Research (2014), https://www.elsevier.com/connect/new-reportmaps-the-landscape-of-global-brain-research; see also RICHARD PASSINGHAM, COGNITIVE
NEUROSCIENCE: A VERY SHORT INTRODUCTION 3 (2016) (“[N]early 30,000 experiments conducted
using fMRI alone.”). Much of this research is described and summarized in ROBERT M. SAPOLSKY,
BEHAVE: THE BIOLOGY OF HUMANS AT OUR BEST AND WORST (2017).
5. Just to be clear, it is not meant to suggest any event ever has a single cause; rather, every
caused event has multiple interacting causes running back indefinitely in time. Statements that “the
brain causes behavior” or the like should be understood as a shorthand for saying that the brain and
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causal explanation presupposes that the brain produces bodily movements
entirely by means of ordinary physical forces and in accordance with
ordinary physical principles.6 By contrast, the mental-cause hypothesis
seems to suppose the existence of forces that have no counterparts
anywhere else in the physical domain. The supposed causative power of
intentions, reasons and other mental states is conceived instead to be a
unique and extraordinary property of minds (whose existence is, of course,
also inexplicable in its own right). The mental-cause explanation of human
behavior bears, in other words, the distinctive mark of an ad hoc gap filler,
a made-to-order tale of cause and effect that has been devised, for perhaps
ulterior reasons of policy,7 to account for an otherwise mysterious
correlation—the apparent link between conscious thoughts and subsequent
conduct.
The question addressed in this article is whether the growing body of
neuroscience evidence should make a legal difference.8 Many are openly
skeptical and argue that it should not.9 This skepticism no doubt results in

central nervous system—and, indeed, the body’s physiology generally—play a decisive causal role in
directing and producing an individual’s behavior. That is, “brain causation” refers metonymically to all
of the biomechanical causes of behavior that operate “inside the skin,” as it were, with the exception of
possible mental-state causes.
6. My understanding of the neuron-based description of human behavior is based primarily on
IRA B, BLACK, INFORMATION IN THE BRAIN (1991) (focusing on molecular level); JEAN-PIERRE
CHANGEUX, NEURONAL MAN: THE BIOLOGY OF THE MIND (1985) (general introduction to brain
structure and its functioning in information processing); PATRICIA S. CHURCHLAND, NEUROPHILOSOPHY:
TOWARD A UNIFIED SCIENCE OF THE MIND/BRAIN (1986) (comprehensive essay relating
neurophysiological findings to the perennial "mind/body" problem); PATRICIA S. CHURCHLAND &
TERRENCE J. SEJNOWSKI, THE COMPUTATIONAL BRAIN (1992) (information processing across biological
neural networks); ANTHONY SAMASIO, DESCARTES' ERROR: EMOTION, REASON, AND THE HUMAN BRAIN
(2005); DAVID H. HUBEL, EYE, BRAIN AND VISION (1988) (brain information processing with emphasis
on visual information); BRYAN KOLB & IAN Q. WINSHAW, FUNDAMENTALS OF HUMAN BRAIN AND
BEHAVIOR (4th ed. 2012); PASSINGHAM, supra note 4, at 73; ROBERT M. SAPOLSKY, BEHAVE: THE
BIOLOGY OF HUMANS AT OUR BEST AND WORST (2017); see also DANIEL J. AMIT, MODELING BRAIN
FUNCTION (1989) (introducing a mathematical model of brain decision function); ARNOLD TREHUB, THE
COGNITIVE BRAIN (1991) (a neurophysiological account of human cognitive processing); DANIAL
DENNETT, CONSCIOUSNESS EXPLAINED 162–66 (1991) (a very readable tour-de-force on the mind as the
work of the brain); PAUL M. CHURCHLAND, A NEUROCOMPUTATIONAL PERSPECTIVE (1989).
7. See infra note 24; Morse, Inevitable Mind, supra note 3, at 46–47; Morse, Translation,
supra note 3, at 543 (quoted infra note 24); Morse, Folk Psychology, supra note 3, at 2–3.
8. This is not a topic of passing interest: the number of neurolaw publications has grown from
around 100 to over 1600 in just the past 10 or so years. Owen D. Jones & Anthony D. Wagner, Law
and Neuroscience: Promise, Progress and Pitfalls, in THE COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCES 3 (Michael
Gazzaniga et al. eds., 2019). Among notable examples are Joshua Greene & Jonathon Cohen, For the
Law, Neuroscience Changes Nothing and Everything, PHIL. TRANS. ROYAL SOCIETY 1775–1785
(2004); LAW AND THE BRAIN 207 (Semir Zeki & Oliver R. Goodenough eds., 2006); Robert M.
Sapolsky, The Frontal Cortex and the Criminal Justice System, 359 PHIL. TRANS. R. SOC. LOND. 1787
(2004) (stressing the persisting “two cultures” problem that divides legal and scientific modes of
thinking and hinders communication of advances in the latter field for incorporation into the former).
9. See, e.g., infra note 47 (“[N]euroscience has little to contribute”); Morse, Translation, supra
note 3, at 534 (“The law will be fundamentally challenged only if neuroscience or any other science
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part from the fact that the neuroscience view of behavior causation is at
odds with the law’s foundational assumption that offenders “deserve” to
be punished because their actions are due to culpable mental states.10 This
neuroskeptical position will be examined and found wanting.
In Part I, we review the central role of mental causation in our
thinking about criminal justice. In Part II, the article looks more closely at
the core of the skeptical view of neuroscience. Part III considers the threat
that the findings of neuroscience pose to the traditional mental-causation
justifications for punishment. In Part IV, there will be a review of the
meager evidence that mental causation occurs and of the logical fallacy
that is commonly employed in drawing inferences from that evidence. Part
V is a comparative evaluation of the case for mental causation and its
newer rival, the causal explanation provided by neuroscience, using the
methodology of “inference to best explanation.” Finally, in Part VI, the
article will close with a consideration of some of the implications for
criminal justice if the mental-causation hypothesis is supplanted by the
biomechanical alternative that is provided by neuroscience.

can conclusively demonstrate that the law’s psychology is wrong and we are not the type of creatures
for whom mental states are causally effective”). A complete list of neuroskeptical writings would be
impossible here, but some that will be mentioned further on include: Steven K. Erickson, Blaming the
Brain, 11 MINN. J L. SCI. & TECH. 27 2010; Iskra Fileva & Jonathon Tresan, Will Retributivism Die
and Will Neuroscience Kill It? COGNITIVE SYSTEMS RESEARCH 34–35 (2015) (concluding that
neuroscience does not disprove free will—not focusing on mental causation per se); Nita Farahany, A
Neurological Foundation for Freedom, STAN. TECH. L. REV. 4 (2012); Hedda Hassel Mørch, The
Evolutionary Argument for Phenomenal Powers, 31 PHIL. PERSPECTIVES 293 (2018); Michael S.
Pardo & Dennis Patterson, Morse Mind and Mental Causation, 11 CRIM L. & PHIL. 111–26 (2017);
Jones & Wagner, supra note 8 (mildly neuroskeptical); Christopher P. Taggart, Retributivism, 111
(2017) (presenting “an alternative, rational-teleological account of what it means to explain actions in
terms of mental states (or reasons)”); Katrina L. Sifferd, What Does It Mean to Be a Mechanism?
Stephen Morse, Non-reductivism, and Mental Causation, 11 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 143 (2014),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2512325; Christopher P. Taggart, Retributivism,
Agency, and the Voluntary Act Requirement, 36 PACE L. REV. 645, 647 (2016) (making a case that
“agent causation” is at least “plausible”).
10. See Morse, Inevitable Mind, supra note 3, at 46–47 (recognizing the inconsistency and
arguing that retribution is not “inherently harsh” and the alternatives are “disrespectful and
dehumanizing”).
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I. MENTAL CAUSATION AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE
Modern criminal law takes the existence of mental causation for
granted in a number of ways, presupposing that a person’s conduct can be
caused by her intentions, reasons and other mental states.11 For example,
the law’s so-called “voluntary act” requirement—which requires a harm
caused by volitional conduct for there to be a crime12—not only assumes
that mental causation is real but accords it a central role in justifying
punishment.13 Similarly, the development and importance of mens rea
requirements over the past 500 years14 would have made no sense if it

11. The term “mental state” is used here, as in law, with its “ordinary language, common
sense” meaning. Morse, Folk Psychology, supra note 3, at 2–3, 10; see also Morse, Inevitable Mind,
supra note 3, at 35 (“Mental state requirements, including the mental states that are the criteria for
voluntary action, mens rea, and justifications and excuses, reflect the criminal law’s concern with
intentionality and express the meaning of an action including the agent’s attitudes towards the rights
and interests of the victim”); Morse, Translation, supra note 3, at 530.
12. See. e.g., Martin v. State, 17 So. 2d 427 (Ala. App. 1944); State v. Utter, 479 P.2d 946
(Wash. App. 1971); Rollin M. Perkins, Rationale of Mens Rea, 52 HARV. L. REV. 905, 912–13 (1939)
(the harmful result must have been “brought about” by a voluntary act); WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 4
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND § 2 (1758) (“[A]n unwarrantable act without a vicious
will is no crime at all”); MODEL PENAL CODE §2.01(1). See generally Deborah W. Denno, Crime and
Consciousness: Science and Voluntary Acts, 87 MINN. L. REV. 269, 275 (2002) (“Doctrinally, all
criminal liability depends on one ‘fundamental predicate’: A defendant’s guilt must be based on
conduct and that conduct must include a ‘voluntary act’ or omission to engage in a voluntary act that
the defendant was capable of performing”); DRESSLER, supra note 2, at 87 (“[A] person is not guilty of
a crime unless her conduct includes a voluntary act”). Crimes by omission (failure to perform a legal
duty to act, see generally id. at 105–11) also appear to be generally subject to a volition requirement,
see United States v. Montague, 75 F. Supp. 2d 670 (S.D. Texas 1999), particularly inasmuch as
omissions can be crimes only if the accused failed to act despite being “physically capable of
performing the act.” DRESSLER, supra note 2, at 105. The “volition” consists in voluntarily doing
something other than performing the duty to act in question.
13. See generally Kevin W. Saunders, Voluntary Acts and the Criminal Law: Justifying
Culpability Based on the Existence of Volition, 49 U. PITT. L. REV. 443 (1988) (discussing the criminal
law’s “reluctance to ascribe responsibility to a person whose body alone was involved in the act”).
According to Holmes, an act is a “muscular contraction” that is “willed,” and “[t]he reason for
requiring an [willed] act is, that an act implies a choice, and that it is felt to be impolitic and unjust to
make a man answerable for harm, unless he might have chosen otherwise.” OLIVER WENDELL
HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 54 (Bos., Little Brown & Co. 1881).
14. See, e.g., Elonis v. United States, 135 S.Ct. 2001, 2009 (2015) (stating that “the basic
principle [is] that wrongdoing must be conscious to be criminal” and that “the ‘general rule’ is that a
guilty mind is ‘a necessary element in the indictment and proof of every crime’”) (quoting United
States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250, 251 (1922)); Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 606 (1994)
(“[O]ffenses that require no mens rea generally are disfavored”); United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co.,
438 U.S. 422, 438 (1978); Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952); see also United States v.
Cordoba-Hincapie, 825 F. Supp. 485, 491 (E.D.N.Y. 1993) (stating that “the requirement of a guilty
state of mind (at least for the more serious crimes) had been developed by the time of Coke” [15521634]) (citation omitted). See generally Francis Bowles Sayre, Mens Rea, 45 HARV. L. REV. 974, 975–
1004 (1932) (magisterial treatment of the history of mens rea).
So-called “strict liability” crimes do not require mens rea but they are still subject to the
requirement of a voluntary act (and hence seem to presuppose mental causation). See MODEL PENAL
CODE §2.01(1); SUSAN MANDBERG, STRICT LIABILITY, THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIMINOLOGY AND
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were not supposed that culpable mental states can play an active role as
but-for causes15 of unlawful conduct.16

CRIMINAL JUSTICE (2014) (“To convict a person of a strict liability crime, the prosecution still must
prove a voluntary act or omission”); see also MICHAEL MOORE, PLACING BLAME: A THEORY OF THE
CRIMINAL LAW 317 (2010) (“The voluntary act requirement requires that the accused intends that his
body moves at all; the mens rea requirements are, respectively, that the accused . . . intends his
movements to cause [the prohibited result, and knows they will cause the prohibited result].”).
15. It should be noted that the discussion in this article concerns causal explanations. Not all
explanations are causal explanations. For example, one might explain that birds build nests in the
spring because they need places to raise their young (rather than in terms of the behavioral effects of
season-induced hormones, etc.). This explanation is informative and adds to our coherent picture of the
world because it portrays nest building as an instance of a larger phenomenon that is already
understood, namely, of parents working to provide for offspring. But it is not causal explanation. Birds
building nests may not have a clue that they are even about to have young, let alone what they will
need. Similarly, even if mental states are epiphenomenal, particular kinds of mental states (for
example, intentions to do X) may have a kind of explanatory utility as “mental ways of grouping
physical states and events.” W.V.O. QUINE, PURSUIT OF TRUTH 72 (1992). Since we do not have direct
knowledge of our conative brain states as such, a person says “I did X because I intended to do X”
rather than “I did X because of brain states that I experienced as intentions to do X” It would be
analogous to describing the contents of my computer’s memory by describing the words and figures
that appear on its screen (as in: “I have pictures of my vacation stored on my laptop”). Notice,
however, that while this analogy may be read to imply that the brain can detect and “read” the
qualitative contents of mental states, it should not be so understood, for the reasons set out infra Part
IV.B.
Following the philosopher of the mind Jaegwon Kim, the conception of “causation” is used in the
present discussion to mean “actual productive/generative mechanisms involving energy flow,
momentum transfer, and the like, and not merely . . . counterfactual dependencies.” JAEGWON KIM,
PHYSICALISM, OR SOMETHING NEAR ENOUGH 47 (2005) [hereinafter KIM, PHYSICALISM]. For
example, even though on sunny days the hands on my watch move around the dial if and only if the
sun crosses the sky (a counterfactual dependency), it would not be correct to say that my watch
“causes” the sun to move across the sky, or vice versa. The “productive/generative” meaning of
causation is, I believe, also the one that is understood in legal conception of “but-for causation.”
16. The suggestion has been made that, strictly speaking, responsibility does not require a “but
for” causal connection between culpable mental states and wrongful conduct, and that punishment can
be justified as long as the culpable mental state was at least present during prohibited conduct; it is
enough that wrongdoer mentally wanted to do the prohibited conduct or approved of doing it. See Nita
A. Farahany, A Neurological Foundation for Freedom, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF LAW AND
NEUROSCIENCE 51, 66 (Patterson et al. eds., 2016) (“One can be morally responsible by choosing to
act according to one’s own desire to act, even if no other outcome would be possible”), adapting an
argument originally made by Harry Frankfurt, Alternative Possibilities and Moral Responsibility, 66 J.
PHIL. 829, 833, 837–39 (1969); Saunders, supra note 13, at 454 n.7, 466–75. A similar argument
appears to have been made by Hilary Bok. See HILARY BOK, FREEDOM AND RESPONSIBILITY 203
(1995) (“[T]he claim that we are free is a claim not about the relation of our choices and actions to the
theoretical system of causes but about their relation to the agent’s practical system of reasons”).
The idea that mens rea need only coincide with the criminal act and need not causally contribute
to producing the crime does not, however, appear to have support in the law. It is, for example, at odds
with the rule of accomplice liability under which a person cannot be held criminally accountable as an
accomplice based solely on a secret wish to see the crime occur if the person does nothing to aid or
encourage its actual commission. See, e.g., State v. V.T., 5 P.3d 1234 (Utah Ct. App. 2000); State v.
Hoselton, 371 S.E.2d 366 (W.Va. 1988). Kevin Saunders has made a worthy legal argument for
punishing non-causative culpable mental states by analogy to the prohibition on criminal solicitation,
which, under the Model Penal Code, is punishable even if the solicitation is not actually effectively
communicated to the solicited. Saunders, supra note 13, at 466–75 (relying on MODEL PENAL CODE §
5.02). Arguably, however, this provision is inapposite if mental states are “inherently unlikely” to
cause a crime, Saunders, supra note 13, at 474, because it presupposes that culpable mental states at
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The contention that an injury can amount to a crime only when
inflicted by intention is no provincial or transient notion. It is . . .
universal and persistent in mature systems of law . . . . A relation
between some mental element and punishment for a harmful act is
almost . . . instinctive . . . .”17
But even though the facticity of mental causation may seem intuitively
obvious, there is reason for genuine doubt. The mental-causation
hypothesis is founded on the belief that mental states, such as intentions
and reasons, can cause changes to occur in the physical domain—and
thereby affect and direct what people do. The theory is that mental states
“play a genuinely causal role in explaining human behavior”18 and, as
such, are able to produce actions instead of, or at least in addition to, the
biomechanical brain causation described by neuroscience.19 The problem
is that no one knows how.20 It turns out that most or all of the obviousness
of mental causation rests on a logical fallacy,21 and “[c]enturies of
philosophical effort have failed to establish that a mental act or volition
may cause . . . a bodily movement.”22
Punishment—the systematic infliction of hardship, deprivation and
misery on human beings—is obviously a serious matter. As a criminal
justice practice it is far out of step with the usual moral understandings of
right and wrong.23 For those who genuinely care whether such inflictions
are morally right, a lot rides on the question of whether mental causation
really occurs, viz. whether intentions and reasons really can cause physical
conduct and influence behavior: “If the concept of mental causation that
underlies folk psychology and current conceptions of responsibility is

least can be causally efficacious and thereby serve as a criterion of dangerousness. See DRESSLER,
supra note 2, at §28.01[D] and comments to the Model Penal Code quoted in Saunders, supra note 13,
at 469 n.109, 472. It seems to me, however, that all of these arguments are subject to the same basic
objection: If culpable mental states are causally inefficacious, then they are harmless, and it is illogical
to punish a person for an aspect of her personality that is harmless if she would not be subject to
punishment for another aspect of her personality that is harmful but not in itself culpable.
17. Morissette, 342 U.S. at 250–51.
18. Morse, Translation, supra note 3, at 532.
19. Morse, Folk Psychology, supra note 3, at 1; Morse, Translation, supra note 3, at 530.
20. Morse, Inevitable Mind, supra note 3, at 33 (“[W]e do not have a clue”).
21. See infra Part IV. Specifically, the main case for mental causation rests on the fallacy of
“post hoc ergo proper hoc,” the false assumption that a given event was caused by a prior event just
because it came after the prior event.
22. Saunders, supra note 13, at 466.
23. Just to be clear, nothing in the neuroscience explanation of human behavior denies the
important moral distinction between right and wrong conduct (“normativity”) or implies that such a
distinction cannot be an effective guide for behavior. For my earlier brief exploration of these issues,
see John A. Humbach, Does Hard Incompatibilism Really Abolish ‘Right’ and ‘Wrong’? Some
Thoughts in Response to Larry Alexander, (Mar. 14, 2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?ab
stract_id=2933749; see also infra Part II.D.
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false, our responsibility practices . . . would appear unjustifiable.”24
Modern punishment precepts and methodologies—if not the whole project
of criminal “justice”—would be thrown into question. And it turns out, on
reflection, that the case for mental causation could hardly be more flimsy.
Advances in neuroscience since the middle of the last century have
greatly expanded our understanding of the biomechanical processes
occurring in the brain and central nervous system.25 They have revealed in
considerable detail how electrical activity in the brain can cause bodily
movements and therefore produce behavior, not just in human beings but
in virtually every kind of multicellular animal organism found on earth.26
They show how biological organisms function as complex adaptive inputoutput systems in which electrochemically encoded information acquired
by the sense organs and internal sensors is passed to the brain where
various populations of neurons computationally process the information
and integrate it with neuronally-embodied information stored from past
experiences, on the basis of which they then produce the goal-directed,
coordinated motor impulses that actuate the muscles in response to
surrounding circumstances.27 This is all it takes to cause every move we
make.
In other words, the evidence of neuroscience shows that the causes of
human behavior traditionally thought to be “mental” (including behavior
punished by the criminal law) are almost certainly entirely physical in
nature, occurring in strict accordance with the physical laws that govern
the electrochemistry within nerve cells, the brain and the body.28 Unlike

24. Morse, Translation, supra note 3, at 543; see also Morse, Inevitable Mind, supra note 3, at
46–47; Morse, Folk Psychology, supra note 3, at 2–3.
25. See supra notes 4 and 6.
26. In a comment on the fundamental similarities of the sources of brain-directed behavior,
Owen Jones and Timothy Goldsmith have written: “In all but a few universities, human behavior is
studied . . . in one set of buildings, while the behavior of every [other] species . . . is studied in other
buildings. There are reasons for this—but few good ones.” Owen D Jones & Timothy H. Goldsmith,
Law and Behavioral Biology, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 405, 407 (2005).
27. See SAPOLSKY, supra, note 6, at 21–77, 535–36 (describing and summarizing how the
brain chooses and produces bodily movements); PASSINGHAM, supra, note 4, at 66–81; and other
sources cited supra note 6.
Note that saying the brain produces behavior by biomechanical or “computational” processes is
not at all the same as saying the workings of the mind are “computational” or embracing the so-called
computational theory of mind. It is important that the two not be confused. In saying the brain
produces behavior by biomechanical or computational processes, I mean only that the workings of
individual neurons and the connections between them follow simple algorithms and that the combined
outputs of the algorithmic neurons in their networks produce the motor outputs of the brain.
28. Notice that to be in strict accordance with physical laws is not necessarily the same as to be
deterministic. Physical interactions are themselves sometimes indeterministic (notably at the quantum
level) and there is at least some reason to believe that neuronal activity may not always be
deterministic. See Fileva & Tresan, supra note 8, at 10; Adina Roskies, Neuroscientific Challenges to
Free Will and Responsibility, 10 TRENDS IN COGNITIVE SCI. 420 (2006) (“Whether or not a neuron
will fire, what pattern of action potentials it generates, or how many synaptic vesicles are released
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the “folk psychology” of mental causation that underlies modern criminal
law,29 the neuroscience explanation of behavior is not merely consistent
with the physical laws that apply throughout the Universe. It is built upon
them. Despite extensive studies of the complex of mechanisms within the
person that produce human behavior,30 no empirical evidence has ever
appeared that alternative, non-neuronal sources of coordinated muscular
activation (behavior) might exist. No explanatory gaps have been
encountered in the neuroscience explanation of behavior that could be
filled by mental causation.
This is not to say there are no remaining gaps in the scientific
understanding of human psychology. There are, and neuroskeptics point to
these epistemic lacunae as reasons to discount the relevance of
neuroscience to criminal justice.31 One alleged “major problem” bearing
on that relevance, identified by neuroscientist Robert Sapolsky, is that the
science to date is very long on explanation but short on ability to
specifically predict misconduct, mostly due to the “multifactorial” nature
of behavioral biology.32 Every bodily movement is, he points out,
produced by an interplay of huge numbers of causal factors,33 and this
multiplicity tends to make the predictions of neuroscience only
approximate and “statistical.”34 Professor Sapolsky may however be
unduly modest: An inability to get a precise reading or measurement of a
multiplicity of causal factors is not at all the same as not knowing what

have all been characterized as stochastic phenomena in our current best models”). In other words, it is
possible that “neurodeterminism,” in the sense of control of the body by neuronal activity, is not fully
“deterministic” (in the super-hard sense that every state of the Universe is ineluctably entailed by
preceding states). But even if neurodeterminism is not fully deterministic, this would not in itself mean
that the operations of the brain and central nervous system leave room for a causal role to be played by
“free will,” mental causation or other alternatives to neuronal activity in controlling what people do.
29. See generally Morse, Folk Psychology, supra note 3, at 1; Morse, Translation, supra note 3,
at 530; Morse, Inevitable Mind, supra note 3, at 34.
30. See supra note 4.
31. See, e.g., Stephen J. Morse, Avoiding Irrational NeuroLaw Exuberance: A Plea for
Neuromodesty, 62 MERCER L. REV. 837, 859 (2011); Dennis Patterson, Neuromania: A Review of
Peter A. Alces, The Moral Conflict of Law and Neuroscience, 5 J. L. & BIOSCI. 440, 441 (2018)
(“[N]euroscience simply has not progressed to the point where it can even tell us how the brain enables
the mind”); Uri Maoz & Gideon Yaffe, What Does Recent Neuroscience Tell Us About Criminal
Responsibility? 3 J. LAW BIOSCI. 120 (2015).
32. SAPOLSKY, supra note 6, at 598–605.
33. See id. Professor Sapolsky discusses the many kinds of factors influencing behavior during
the second before it occurs, minutes before, hours before, etc. Just to begin to give an idea of the
numerosity of factors, they potentially include the specific synaptic strengths and connections of
millions of neurons that may figure into the balance leading to a given behavioral choice—not to
mention interoceptive and hormonal inputs from outside the brain that potentially implicate virtually
any part of the body’s physiology. And these are just factors existing during the seconds before the
movement occurs. Id. at 21–98.
34. See id. at 36, note †.
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those factors are—and it is surely not a good reason to conclude that
something other than ordinary physical forces must therefore be at work. It
is similarly not possible to get a reading on all of the complex factors that
make the weather or move the stock market, but no one thinks this is a
reason to believe that immaterial spirit-like forces are involved. That sort
of logical leap is seen only among friends of mental causation.
Perhaps more notably, neuroscience still does not provide a solution to
the “really hard problem of consciousness,”35 which is to explain how
mental states and consciousness could possibly exist in a physical universe
in the first place.36 “Despite the astonishing advances in neuroimaging and
other neuroscientific methods, we still do not have sophisticated causal
knowledge of how the brain enables the mind and action generally.”37 But
this argument against the relevance of neuroscience also misses the mark.
When the question is how well neuroscience explains behavior, it is
ultimately beside the point whether it is able to explain something else,
namely consciousness, until there is reliable evidence that consciousness
has something to do with behavior. What the findings of neuroscience do
provide is a sophisticated knowledge of the mechanisms by which the
brain produces bodily movements, and it is that knowledge which is
relevant to a causal explanation of behavior: The evidence shows that
unbroken sequences of computational neuronal events run from sensory
inputs to motor outputs, and these neuronal events are the sole
determinants in evidence of what human beings and other innervated
organisms do. No one has ever seen the slightest physiological evidence
that there is an alternative or parallel “mental” path of behavior causation.
And until research uncovers evidence that mental states or consciousness
plays a role in producing human behavior, an explanation of how mental
states come into being, though intensely interesting as a philosophical
matter, is simply not necessary for a complete causal explanation of why
people do what they do.

35. David J. Chalmers, Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness, 2 J. CONSCIOUSNESS
STUD. 200 (1995).
36. See Robert Van Gulick, Consciousness 5.2, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY
(2014); see also THOMAS NAGEL, MIND AND COSMOS: WHY THE MATERIALIST NEO-DARWINIAN
CONCEPTION OF NATURE IS ALMOST CERTAINLY WRONG (2012); DAVID J. CHALMERS, THE
CONSCIOUS MIND: IN SEARCH OF A FUNDAMENTAL THEORY (rev. ed. 1997); Hedda Hassel Mørch, Is
Matter Conscious?, NAUTILUS (Apr. 6, 2017), http://nautil.us/issue/47/consciousness/is-matterconscious.
37. Stephen J. Morse, Law and the Sciences of the Brain/Mind, in OXFORD HANDBOOK ON
LAW AND THE REGULATION OF TECHNOLOGY 24 (Roger Brownsword, ed., 2017) [hereinafter Morse,
LAWSCI], https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship/1642/; Morse, Inevitable Mind, supra
note 3, at 33 (“[W]e do not have a clue”); LEGAL, MORAL, AND METAPHYSICAL TRUTHS: THE
PHILOSOPHY OF MICHAEL S. MOORE 233, 235 (Kimberly Ferzan & Stephen J. Morse eds., 2015) (“The
brain enables the mind and action, but we have no idea how”); see also infra note 161.
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The idea that the mind causes behavior has been long accepted by
most people and by the law despite the lack of evidence for it.38 But this
acceptance is understandable when one considers that, until recently, no
other causal explanation of human behavior has had any evidentiary
support either. As long as the mental-causation model had no nonspeculative challenger, nothing stood in the way of its becoming firmly
embedded in popular notions of justice as well as in the law itself; it was
able to persist unquestioned essentially by default. Recent neuroscience
research has, however, changed this picture significantly. The emergence
of a documented, evidence-based alternative to the mental-causation
hypothesis has deprived the folk-psychology narrative of its explanatory
monopoly. By providing a physical account of behavior causation, from
sensory input to muscular output, that leaves no gaps that mental states are
needed to fill,39 the neuroscience alternative to folk-psychology has begun
to make mental causation look, at best, like an otiose excrescence on an
otherwise elegant explanatory picture.
The emergence of a creditable alternative to mental causation as a
causal explanation of behavior inevitably suggests a need for a
reevaluation and corresponding rethinking of criminal justice practices and
punishment criteria that presuppose that mental causation occurs.40 If
indeed blame and responsibility are based on mental causation, the
question arises whether it is still reasonable to think41 that those who do
wrong “deserve” to receive suffering and deprivation purposely inflicted
by the state.
Given the formidable neuroscience findings as to the causes of human
behavior, why do so many still look with a skeptical eye at the findings’
implications for law? The most probable reason is that neuroscience’s

38. See infra Part IV.
39. See supra note 27.
40. See, e.g., Greene & Cohen, supra note 8; cf. Morse, Translation, supra note 3, at 534 (“The
law will be fundamentally challenged only if neuroscience or any other science can conclusively
demonstrate that the law’s psychology is wrong and we are not the type of creatures for whom mental
states are causally effective”).
41. By the way, I do not mean to express any particular philosophical commitments by making
casual use of everyday mentalistic words like “think.” Because I am writing in English, there is little
choice but to use such locutions and expressions since the English language was, for better or worse,
devised by people who believed in mental causation and it is, accordingly shot through with marks of
that belief. Such word choices should not, however, be taken as an implicit acquiescence in any
particular philosophy of the mind, such as mental states are anything but epiphenomenal (i.e., causally
inert). Accordingly, consistent with the neuroscience explanation of behavior, these casual uses of
mentalist locutions should (unless the context otherwise requires) be understood to refer to the brain
states and neuronal activity on which our mental life and consciousness depend. See Morse,
Translation, supra note 3, at 532 (“[M]ental states . . . are fully produced by and realizable in the
brain”).
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biomechanical explanation of behavior challenges a deeply felt belief—the
belief that lawbreakers deserve to suffer because their intentions cause
harmful acts.42 It contradicts the widely-shared urge to deal with harmful
events by finding someone to blame and meting out harm in return, instead
of seeking out causes and implementing prevention. Those who doubt the
justice implications of neuroscience do not, however, usually contest the
validity of research findings themselves. As a practical matter, only a
neuroscientist is well equipped to do that, and there are few if any actual
neuroscientists who do not broadly share the scientific biomechanical view
of human behavior. For non-scientists, the expedient thing to do is in any
case to argue, not that the findings of neuroscience are wrong, but rather
that they are simply irrelevant: They are irrelevant to normative questions
generally43 and to criminal justice policy in particular because they do not
rule out mental causation.44 It is this skeptical stance that will be the
primary focus of the discussion that follows.
Professor Stephen J. Morse is a leading exponent of the view that
nothing in the findings of neuroscience requires us to rethink the
prevailing conceptions of moral responsibility and criminal justice
practice.45 His writings,46 taken together, present what is probably the most
comprehensive and thoughtful statement by a legal scholar of the position

42. See Morse, Neurolaw, infra note 46, at 16 (“This thought [that responsibility and, hence,
‘just deserts’ may not be justified] is what disturbs people about scientific understanding of human
behavior, which relentlessly exposes the numerous causal variables that seem to toss us about like light
ships in a raging sea storm”).
43. See infra Part II.D.
44. See infra Part II.C.
45. See SAPOLSKY, supra note 6, at 598 (“He is the definitive advocate of free will being
compatible with a deterministic world”).
46. While the list of Professor Morse’s publications in this area is uncommonly long, many of
them cover much the same ground and the present discussion will draw primarily from those cited
supra note 3 and the following: Stephen J. Morse, NeuroEthics: NeuroLaw OXFORD HANDBOOK
ONLINE (2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2919011 [hereinafter Morse,
Neurolaw]; Morse, LAWSCI, supra note 37; Morse, Translation, supra note 3, at 530; Morse,
Inevitable Mind, supra note 3; Stephen J. Morse, Neuroscience, Free Will, and Criminal
Responsibility, in FREE WILL AND THE BRAIN: NEUROSCIENTIFIC, PHILOSOPHICAL, AND LEGAL
PERSPECTIVES 283 (Walter Glannon ed., 2015) [hereinafter Morse, Free Will]; Stephen J. Morse,
Criminal Law and Common Sense: An Essay on the Perils and Promise of Neuroscience, 99
MARQUETTE L. REV. 39 (2015) [hereinafter Morse, Common Sense]; Stephen J. Morse, Neuroscience
and the Future of Personhood and Responsibility (2013), https://www.brookings.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2016/06/0203_neuroscience_morse.pdf; Stephen J. Morse, Moore on the Mind 4
(2015), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2705192 [hereinafter Morse, Moore on
the Mind]; Stephen J. Morse, Scientific Challenges to Criminal Responsibility, in JOEL FEINBERG ET
AL., PHILOSOPHY OF LAW (9th ed. 2014) [hereinafter Morse, Scientific Challenges]; Stephen J. Morse,
Brain Overclaim Redux, J. LAW & INEQUALITY (2012) [hereinafter Morse, Overclaim Redux]; Stephen
J. Morse, Avoiding Irrational NeuroLaw Exuberance: A Plea for Neuromodesty, 62 MERCER L. REV.
828 (2011) [hereinafter Morse, Exuberance]; Stephen J. Morse, Brain Overclaim Syndrome and
Criminal Responsibility: A Diagnostic 3 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 397–412 (2006) [hereinafter Morse,
Overclaim].
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that “neuroscience has little to contribute to a more just and accurate
criminal law decision-making concerning policy, doctrine, and individual
case adjudication.”47 This paper undertakes to critique48 the skeptical view
of neuroscience’s value to the quest for justice, with particular attention to
arguments made by Professor Morse as the leader in the field. Most of the
points made in the discussion should, however, apply with similar force to
any theories or doctrines of personal responsibility that are based on the
supposition that human actions are caused by intentions or influenced by
reasons.49 My conclusion is that the findings of neuroscience, though
incomplete, already present an extremely strong likelihood that the
currently dominant moral justifications for punishment inflictions are
based on erroneous factual assumptions.
II. THE CORE OF THE SKEPTICAL VIEW
The central thesis of the neuroskeptical position is that the relevance
of neuroscience to criminal law and punishment practices is vastly
exaggerated and “overclaimed.”50 “Given how little we know about the
brain-mind and brain-mind-action connections,” Professor Morse has
written, “to claim that we should radically change our conceptions of
ourselves and our legal doctrines and practices based on neuroscience is a
form of neuroarrogance.”51

47. Morse, Exuberance, supra note 46, at 859.
48. I refer the reader also to the thoughtful critique of Professor Morse (and his neuroenthusiast
counterparts, Joshua Greene and Jonathon Cohen, supra note 8). See Adam Kolber, Will There Be a
NeuroLaw Revolution? 89 IND. L. REV. 807, 811 (2014). Michael Pardo and Dennis Patterson have
also critiqued Professor Morse’s reliance on the mental-causation hypothesis, suggesting instead that
responsibility and punishment can be based instead on the teleological explanation for the conduct in
question. Michael S. Pardo & Dennis Patterson, Morse, Mind and Mental Causation, 11 CRIM. L. &
PHIL. 111 (2017). The problem with this alternative is that a teleological explanation is not a causal
explanation unless the teleological “reason” for the behavior is represented in the agent, mentally or
physically, prior to the action that it is supposed explain/cause. This leads us back again to the same
question faced by the standard mental-causation hypothesis. If the teleological “reason” is represented
solely as a physical state, how can it have moral significance; if it is represented as a mental state, how
can it have causal efficacy? This is important because, if the culpable teleological explanation does not
play a causal role in producing the behavior, then we would again have a case of blame being based on
the mere presence of a culpable mental state that is, apart from its simultaneity, unconnected to the
behavior in question. See supra note 16.
49. See supra note 9.
50. See Morse, Overclaim, supra note 46, at 397–412; see also Morse, Neurolaw, supra note
46, at 7, 31; Morse, Exuberance, supra note 46, at 859.
51. Id.
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A. Mental Cause, Agency and Responsibility
The “conception of ourselves” that neuroskepticism seems most
concerned to preserve is the idea that people are morally responsible
“agents,” which means “creatures who act intentionally for reasons, who
can be guided by reasons.”52 The assumption that persons are “agents,”
and are therefore responsible for their acts, is thought to underlie the moral
rightness of key legal doctrines and practices such as punishment and the
notion that offenders “deserve” it.53 “If practical reason plays no role in
explaining our behavior, as some neuroscientists . . . claim, current
responsibility doctrines and practices would have to be radically altered or
jettisoned altogether.”54 Mental causation by intentions and reasons, which
is what defines a person as an agent, is thus the key to moral responsibility
and just deserts. “It is an incoherent notion to have genuine responsibility
without agency.”55
By showing that “behavior can be explained solely by reference to
physical states . . . and the laws governing changes in those physical
states,”56 neuroscience presents a physiological alternative to the mentalcausation explanation of behavior. This alternative explanation threatens a
fundamental premise of current criminal-justice doctrines and practices.
Although Professor Morse concedes that “the brain, the final pathway to
action, is nothing but a mechanism”57 and “[m]achines do not deserve . . .
punishment,”58 he insists that human beings are not just machines but
agents. And as agents, offenders are morally responsible and deserve
punishment precisely because they are agents: The brain may be a
“mechanism” but, he maintains, “[h]uman behavior cannot be adequately
understood if mental state causation is completely excluded or
eliminated.”59 “Behavior,” he says, “is causally explained by mental states

52. Morse, Inevitable Mind, supra note 3, at 33; Morse, Common Sense, supra note 46, at 40.
Notice that the concept of “agent” and “agency” in this context is not the same as its usual meaning
among lawyers. Rather, the word agent is used here in a philosophical sense to refer to an individual
who is capable of acting based on intentions and for reasons.
53. Morse, Inevitable Mind, supra note 3, at 32–34; Morse, Folk Psychology, supra note 3, at
19 (“[I]f humans are not conscious and intentional creatures who act for reasons that play a causal role
in our behavior, then the foundational facts for responsibility ascriptions are mistaken”).
54. Morse, Folk Psychology, supra note 3, at 2–3 (If “[n]euroscientific
discoveries . . . demonstrate that mental states do not causally explain our behavior . . . it provides
another, independent ground for the claim that responsibility is impossible”).
55. Morse, Common Sense, supra note 46, at 69; Morse, Inevitable Mind, supra note 3, at 46.
56. Andrew Eshleman, Moral Responsibility, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY
(2014), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-responsibility/.
57. Morse, Neurolaw, supra note 46, at 16 (“Neuroscience . . . exposes that the brain, the final
pathway to action, is nothing but a mechanism”).
58. Morse, Inevitable Mind, supra note 3, at 34.
59. Morse, Translation, supra note 3, at 532.
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such as desires, beliefs, plans, willings, and intentions.”60 In other words,
mechanical brain or not, as long as people have mental states that are
involved in causing their behavior, offenders can be held morally
responsible as agents and deserve to be punished for their wrongs.
Somewhat surprisingly, perhaps, the neuroskeptical insistence that
mental states can cause behavior does not necessarily mean a rejection of
determinism —roughly, “the idea that every event is necessitated by
antecedent events and conditions together with the laws of nature.”61
Professor Morse calls determinism a “plausible working hypothesis,”62
and one can see why he would want to do so. Today, after all, determinism
is “a view accepted by most scientifically-informed people even if they are
also humanists,”63 and to insist that events can happen other than
according to natural laws is to risk putting oneself outside the bounds of
contemporary mainstream scholarship. But this reluctance to reject
determinism seems to land Professor Morse in a bit a contradiction: He
tells us on one hand that “[b]ehavior is causally explained by mental
states” such as desires, beliefs intentions, etc.64 But then he says,
deterministically, that “we inhabit a thoroughly material, physical universe
in which all phenomena [including, presumably, human behavior] are
caused by physical laws,”65 apparently conceding that people’s conduct is
not necessarily “free,” i.e., “uncaused by anything other than
themselves.”66 The latter statements, though routinely consistent with
determinism, make it sound a lot like people are not agents. The challenge
that is faced by neuroskeptics like Professor Morse is to find a “plausible,

60. Morse, Inevitable Mind, supra note 3, at 34 (emphasis added); see also Morse, Translation,
supra note 3, at 532. Elsewhere, Professor Morse has said that folk psychology “insists only that
human action is in part causally explained by mental states,” Morse, Translation, supra note 3, at 530
(emphasis added), but makes clear that it is “virtually” only the mentally caused part for which “agents
deserve to be praised, blamed, rewarded, or punished.” Morse, Translation, supra note 3, at 532;
Morse, Exuberance, supra note 46, at 841.
61. Carl Hoefer, Causal Determinism, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (2016),
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/determinism-causal/#ChaDet. Professor Morse describes determinism
as, roughly, the idea “that all events have causes that operate according to the physical laws of the
universe and that were themselves caused by those same laws operating on prior states of the universe
in a continuous thread of causation going back to the first state”—with the usual (essentially
irrelevant) allowance for quantum-level events. Morse, Neurolaw, supra note 46, at 17.
62. Morse, Inevitable Mind, supra note 3, at 45.
63. Morse, Neurolaw, supra note 46, at 16 & 17.
64. Morse, Inevitable Mind, supra note 3, at 34 (emphasis added); see also Morse, Translation,
supra note 3, at 532. As discussed infra Part IV.A., the contradiction may turn out on closer analysis to
be a bit different from what it first seems, lying more in Professor Morse’s adamant rejection of
neurodeterminism and not in determinism tout court.
65. See Morse, Common Sense, supra note 46, at 47; Morse, Inevitable Mind, supra note 3, at
33.
66. I.e., that determinism may be true. Morse, Neurolaw, supra note 46, at 16. Id. at 17–18
(stating that no such “panicky” metaphysics is necessary).
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mainstream” way to embrace determinism, at least provisionally, without
being stuck with its logical implication that persons are not agents and that
“genuine responsibility” is thus impossible.67
Like many if not most modern theorists,68 Professor Morse tries to
thread this needle by declaring adherence to a long established, have-yourcake-and-eat-it-too position known as compatibilism,69 “a set of similar
theories that hold with varying intensity that responsibility is possible in a
deterministic universe as long as agents have the capacity to act according
to their reasons”70 and intentions.71 This compatibilism, which Professor
Morse calls “the dominant position among philosophers of
responsibility,”72 allows one to accept determinism as a “plausible
working hypothesis”73 (and to demur on the fraught question of whether
wrongdoers “can do otherwise”74) even while firmly denying that physical
brains alone determine what a person does in a given situation: “We are
not Pinocchios,” he writes, “and our brains are not Geppettos pulling the
strings.”75

67. Morse, Neurolaw, supra note 46, at 13 (“It is an incoherent notion to have genuine
responsibility without agency”); see also Morse, Common Sense, supra note 46, at 67; Morse,
Inevitable Mind, supra note 3, at 46.
68. Morse, Inevitable Mind, supra note 3, at 45; Morse, Overclaim, supra note 46, at 402.
69. For a summary of many of the varieties of compatibilism, see Michael McKenna,
Compatibilism: State of the Art, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (2015),
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/compatibilism/supplement.html.
70. Morse, Inevitable Mind, supra note 3, at 45; see also Morse, Neurolaw, supra note 46, at 17
(“For those who adopt some variant of this position, agents may be responsible if, roughly, they act
intentionally, with reasonably integrated consciousness, suffer from no major rationality defects, and
act free of compulsion.”).
71. Morse, Neurolaw, supra note 46, at 18. It is a common strategy of modern compatibilism to
posit various features or elements of the reasoning process as appropriate bases for ascribing moral
responsibility. Michael McKenna, Compatibilism: State of the Art, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PHILOSOPHY (2009), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/compatibilism/supplement.html. For example,
Hilary Bok (among others) posits our use of ‘practical reasoning’ as the place in which to find a basis
for ascribing moral responsibility. HILARY BOK, FREEDOM AND RESPONSIBILITY 203 (1995) (“Those
actions that reflect our will, and with respect to which the question what reason we had for performing
them can arise, are actions that . . . we are morally responsible for performing . . . .”). For Daniel
Dennett, it is using our evolved capacity to reflect and adapt. DANIEL C. DENNETT, FREEDOM
EVOLVES 268 (2003) (“[O]ur reflections will actually help determine which trajectory our future
holds”(!); emphasis added). For R. Jay Wallace, the basis of responsibility is the rational power “to
grasp and apply moral reasons, and the power to control one’s behavior in the light of such reasons.”
R. JAY WALLACE, RESPONSIBILITY AND THE MORAL SENTIMENTS 7 (1994).
72. Morse, Inevitable Mind, supra note 3, at 45; Morse, Overclaim, supra note 46, at 402.
73. Morse, Inevitable Mind, supra note 3, at 45.
74. Morse, Common Sense, supra note 46, at 49; see also Morse, Inevitable Mind, supra note 3,
at 45 (“[C]ontra-causal freedom is simply not necessary”). See quotation infra note 78.
75. Morse, Inevitable Mind, supra note 3, at 49. Adam Kolber has written that a
“fundamentally compatibilist criminal law would be insulated from advances in neuroscience that
merely elucidate brain mechanism.” Kolber, NeuroLaw Revolution?, supra note 48, at 822. I am not so
sure, especially if (as seems to be happening) the belief in mental causation appears increasingly to be
improbable as the “best explanation” of the growing body of data. See Part V.
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The neuroskeptics’ urgent moral concern about who or what is
“pulling the strings” of criminal conduct is, to be sure, a relatively modern
one. At one time, requital alone—repaying harm with harm in return—
sufficed in itself to justify punishment.76 If requital still sufficed today,
none of the concern about who pulls the strings would be necessary.
Punishment could simply be a per se consequence of doing harm, and that
would be that. Today, however, it is generally considered morally obtuse
to punish people for harms they utterly did not intend.77 Most would
probably say that a person who faints and knocks another off a dock does
not deserve hardship and deprivation at the hands of the state for the harm
she has “done.” Indeed, it is likely the case that most people in legal
circles now accept that “the criminal deserves punishment because he
could have acted differently,”78 but voluntarily chose not to.79 It is said, for
example, that harm caused by a person in an automatonistic state (moving
as an automaton) does not deserve punishment.80 More generally, most
people today would probably say that punishment can be justly imposed
only on persons who commit intentional or, at least, voluntary wrongdoing
despite having the freedom to do otherwise.

76. See Perkins, supra note 12, at 906; FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, ON THE GENEALOGY OF
MORALS 62–63 (Walter Kauffmann trans., 1967) (1887) (discussing the moral distinction between
punishment for harm alone, akin to repayment of a debt, as opposed to punishment only if there was
also fault; emphasis added).
77. See Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 250 (1952) (citing “the child’s familiar
exculpatory ‘But I didn’t mean to’” as “instinctive”). Curiously, however, there is evidence that
personal attitudes about punishment and its appropriateness may be less a “given” and more pliable
than we may think, being contingent on specific neuronal activity that is subject to modification by
mechanical means, such as magnets applied outside the skull (repetitive transcranial magnetic
stimulation). See Jones & Wagner, supra note 8, at 7; Matthew Ginther et al., Parsing the Behavioral
and Brain Mechanisms of Third-Party Punishment, 36 J. NEUROSCIENCE, 9420–34 (2016). Interesting
experimental results by Shaun Nichols who found that, when people are persuaded that determinism is
true, they are more likely to say that wrongdoers are morally responsible than when they merely
imagine that determinism is true. Shaun Nichols, Experimental Philosophy and the Problem of Free
Will, 331 SCIENCE 1401, 1402 (2011). In other words, when philosophers and others who believe in
free will engage in thought experiments and speculations about the putative effects of determinism
beliefs on attributions of responsibility, their conclusions may be fatally infected by their own personal
beliefs that determinism is actually false and free will is true.
78. NIETZSCHE, supra note 76, at 62–63. See James W. Moore, What Is the Sense of Agency
and Why Does it Matter? FRONTIERS IN PSYCHOLOGY 7 (“[F]or most people it only makes sense to
hold someone responsible for their actions if they are freely in control of them.”); HOLMES, supra note
13, at 54 (“[It is felt to be impolitic and unjust to make a man answerable for harm, unless he might
have chosen otherwise”). See also Honoré’s excellent analysis of “can/can't do otherwise” concept in
A.M. Honoré, Can and Can't, 73 MIND 463 (1964), concluding that to say what one means by “can't
do otherwise” leads into an infinite regress, which can be escaped only by making assumptions that
usually cannot be justified. Daniel Dennett presents an analysis that is similar except it reaches the
opposite conclusion concerning responsibility by seemingly ignoring the infinite regress. DENNETT,
supra note 71.
79. See supra notes 12–13 and accompanying text.
80. See State v. Utter, 479 P.2d 946 (Wash. App. 1971); MODEL PENAL CODE §2.01(1).
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Until recently, a concern to reconcile determinism with rejection of
pure requital-based punishment might have tempted a neuroskeptical
compatibilist to search for a modified definition of “free will.” One might
reason, for example, that even if determinism is true and persons cannot
“do differently,” they still have enough “free will” to be held responsible
and deserve punishment as long as nothing prevents them from acting on
the intentions and reasons they have: As long as one is free to do what one
wants to do, it does not matter (for responsibility and punishment) that one
is not free to choose what one wants.81 But is this really “free will” or just
freedom of movement? The point is arguable, but there has always been
something fishy about the efforts of compatibilists to establish that free
will exists by establishing instead that something else exists and then
calling that something else “free will.”82
Professor Morse has, however, found a way to elide the longinconclusive “free will” debate.83 Pointing out that “the law’s criteria for
responsibility . . . are essentially behavioral—acts and mental states,”84 he
argues that legal doctrine does not actually care whether defendants “could
have acted differently” or not.85 All the law requires, at least for most

81. Morse, Inevitable Mind, supra note 3, at 45; see also supra note 71.
82. Writing in 1788, Kant famously called the compatibilist’s casuistry “a wretched
subterfuge” and “word-jugglery.” IMMANUEL KANT, THE CRITIQUE OF PRACTICAL REASON Ch III
(Thomas Kingsmill Abbott trans., 2014) (1788)
83. Morse, Neurolaw, supra note 46, at 16; Inevitable Mind, supra note 3, at 45 (“People have
been arguing for centuries about whether free will and responsibility are possible . . . . Neuroscience
adds nothing to this debate”); see also Owen D. Jones, the End of (Discussing) Free Will, THE
CHRONICLE REVIEW (Mar. 23, 2012), at 89, reprinted in OWEN D. JONES ET AL., LAW AND
NEUROSCIENCE 132 (2014).
84. Morse, Free Will, supra note 46, at 259.
85. Morse, Folk Psychology, supra note 3, at 3–13 (“[F]ree will or the lack of it is not a
criterion for criminal responsibility or non-responsibility”); Morse, Common Sense, supra note 46, at
53; Stephen J. Morse, The Non-Problem of Free Will in Forensic Psychiatry and Psychology, 25 BEH.
SCI. L. 203 (2007) (“[F]ree will or its lack is not a criterion for any legal doctrine”). Although
Professor Morse is obviously aware that the law generally requires, in order for conduct to be a crime,
that is must include a “voluntary act,” discussed supra notes 12–13, it is at least arguable that the
voluntary-act requirement is not a requirement of free will. For example, an act can be “voluntary”
(i.e., pursuant to a person’s volition) even if the volition itself was utterly dominated by an outside
force. Suppose, for example, that A strongly desires to throw a rock at B because an evil genius with a
wireless mind-controller—or the deterministic operations of cause and effect—made A have that
desire. If nothing prevented A from doing what he strongly desired (“willed”) to do, his act could be
considered “voluntary” even though his volition was ineluctably caused and molded by the evil genius.
More prosaically, a person can be guilty of a crime that she “willfully” committed, even though she
chose to commit it due to a credible threat of immediate death as long as the death threat did not
happen to legally qualify as “duress.” See People v. Anderson. 28 Cal. 4th 770 (2002) (holding that
duress is not a defense to murder); United States v. Contento-Pachon, 723 F.2d 691 (9th Cir. 1984)
(discussing the possibility of dire threats that may not be duress due to, for example, non-imminence).
That said, however, I find it highly dubious that the common law judges over the centuries, imbued as
they would have been with folk psychology, ever actually conceived of “voluntary acts” as being
about anything but free will, specifically, the idea that indeterministic free will lies at the heart of
human action. See generally Kolber, NeuroLaw Revolution?, supra note 48, at 823–26 (“soul-based
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serious crimes, is that defendant did the prohibited act with a culpable
mental state; there is no additional requirement that mental state be under
her control or otherwise “free.” There is, in other words, no legal
requirement of free will86 and, that being the case, the neuroskeptic can
argue that legal responsibility can attach and punishment be deserved
based on agency alone. All that is required for conviction is that the causes
of a defendant’s conduct include mental states, such as intentions, mixed
into the chain of physical causes. In other words, by replacing free will
with mental causation as the defining criterion of responsibility and just
deserts, it is possible to bypass the whole free-will quagmire and simply
concede that determinism is “plausible.” This move also dissolves the
apparent contradiction noted above. After all, there is nothing about
mental causation that makes it necessarily inconsistent with determinism.87
People’s causative intentions and reasons can be just as much predetermined by other causes as non-mental causal factors can be. So
nothing prevents the neuroskeptical compatibilist from accepting the truth
of determinism. The only kind of determinism that a neuroskeptical
compatibilist can not accept is neurodeterminism, at least not the version
implied by neuroscience that denies a causal role for mental states on the
ground that human behavior is produced solely by physiological activity.88
In sum, Professor Morse’s neuroskepticism holds that, as long as
people are agents whose intentions or other mental states are mixed into
the chains of causes that produce their behavior, they can be deemed
legally responsible and deserving of punishment, even if their mental
states and, hence, behavior are the inevitable results of ordinary physical
laws.89 And, he says, nothing in neuroscience or any other science requires

libertarians”). For example, Oliver Wendell Holmes wrote that “[t]he reason for requiring . . . [a
willed] act is, that an act implies a choice, and that it is felt to be impolitic and unjust to make a man
answerable for harm, unless he might have chosen otherwise.” HOLMES, supra note 13, at 54. Several
centuries earlier, Sir Matthew Hale (an early exponent of the “voluntary act” requirement) noted that
“ordinarily things naturally act according to the laws and rules and implanted in natural causes,” but
that “things voluntary [i.e., people] act according to the liberty of their own freedom.” SIR MATTHEW
HALE, THE WORKS, MORAL AND RELIGIOUS, OF SIR MATTHEW HALE, KNT.: THE WHOLE NOW FIRST
COLLECTED AND REVISED. TO WHICH ARE PREFIXED HIS LIFE AND DEATH, Volume I, 369–70 (R.
Wilk ed., 1805). See Hale’s early recognition of the requirement of the voluntary-act requirement in
SIR MATTHEW HALE, A HISTORY OF PLEAS OF THE CROWN 412 (Payne ed. 1800). And wonders why
the complex of mens rea requirements would ever have developed if judges did not think that the
various culpable mental states were within the perpetrator’s free will.
86. See id.
87. Nichols, supra note 77, at 1403 (“Determinism is consistent with the idea that behavior is
produced (i.e., determined) by conscious psychological processes”).
88. See infra Part II.B; see also Roskies, supra note 28, at 422 (noting that it is not determinism
but “reductionism and its attendant consequences, epiphenomenalism or eliminativism, that are most
to be feared as a threat to freedom”).
89. Inevitable Mind, supra note 3, at 46.
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us to discard the “folk psychology” belief that human beings are agents
whose bodily movements and behavior are caused by intentions and
reasons, i.e., by mental states, and not (just) by electrochemical operations
of brain.90
B. Victims of Neuronal Circumstances
Perhaps the number-one bugbear animating Professor Morse and other
neuroskeptics is one or another version of the notion that wrongdoers are
“victims of neuronal circumstances” (VNC)91 and, therefore, cannot be
justly held responsible for the harms they cause. As Professor Morse
tersely says: “Brains do not commit crimes; people commit crimes.”92 The
brain is not the responsible party when persons do wrong, and the
wrongdoer is not a “victim” of her brain.
The VNC hypothesis originated in a much-noted article by Joshua
Greene and Jonathon Cohen.93 In that article, Greene and Cohen pointed to
the considerable evidence that everything a person does is determined by
biomechanical neuronal processes and argued that there is, therefore,
“something fishy about our ordinary conceptions of human action and
responsibility.” Accordingly, they said, the legal principles devised to
reflect current conceptions of human action “may be flawed.”94 If
wrongdoers are (like everyone else) haplessly acting out the prescribed
script of fate, how can punishment, even if sometimes useful,95 ever be
morally deserved?
Following the logic of Greene and Cohen, the harm-producing forces
of cause and effect can be seen to pass through the wrongdoer’s sensory,
neural and motor systems in much the same way that, on a simpler level,
the electrical force of lightning can pass through a tree, shattering a branch
which then falls on a person sheltering beneath. No one would blame the
tree just because a causal chain of destructive forces happened to pass
through it. And so, one may ask, why should we blame a person who is
unlucky enough to become a conduit for a causal chain of harm-producing

90. Inevitable Mind, supra note 3, at 32–33; Translation, supra note 3, at 536, quoted infra text
accompanying note 110.
91. Inevitable Mind, supra note 3, at 45–46.
92. Brain Overclaim, supra note 46, at 397. Taken literally, “brains do not commit crimes” is
an example of a so-called mereological fallacy (falsely attributing characteristics of an entity to one or
more of the parts). If that is all Professor Morse means say, no one could disagree. The statement as a
whole is as true (and banal) as saying: “Stomachs don’t eat lunch. People eat lunch.” But it is not
suggested in this article (or, I think, by neuroscientists) that the brain alone causes behavior, and the
metonymic use of the word “brain” should not be taken to imply otherwise.
93. Greene & Cohen, supra note 8.
94. Id. at 1775.
95. Greene and Cohen advocate that punishment be justified on utilitarian grounds. Id.
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forces that originated elsewhere? To be sure, we are not used to thinking
of human bodies as conduits for chains of cause and effect. But, unless
harmful physical forces can originate uncaused within the human frame,96
the complex adaptive input-output system that we call a person is
continually susceptible to conscription as a conduit in harm-producing
causal chains that originated elsewhere. The paths of causation through
brain and body are obviously far more intricate than those involved in a
lightning bolt passing through a tree, but the principle is the same.
Everything that occurs within a person’s skin, and therefore every bodily
movement we make, is dependent on events that have previously occurred
somewhere else. A person whose neuronal pathways have been
commandeered as a vehicle for harmful forces originating elsewhere is a
“victim of neuronal circumstances.”
Professor Morse is uncompromising in his rejection of the VNC
hypothesis, stating that it “completely contradicts common sense and the
entirety of our experience.”97 “If VNC is true,” he says, “then
compatibilism is false” and “no responsibility is possible.”98 The reason
VNC would make responsibility impossible is that VNC excludes agency
and “[i]t is an incoherent notion to have genuine responsibility without
agency,” 99 viz. the ability to act intentionally, rationally and for reasons.100
It is not entirely clear, however, exactly why Professor Morse considers
VNC to be in itself a barrier to attributing responsibility and justifying
punishment.
Although the VNC hypothesis is inherently deterministic in nature, the
problem that Professor Morse has with VNC is apparently not its
determinism. After all, like all compatibilist doctrines, his brand of
neuroskepticism does not deny that determinism is true.101 But this seems
to lead Professor Morse smack into another contradiction: If determinism
is true, then presumably every person’s intentions, reasons and other
mental states are just as much predetermined by prior events as a VNC’s
brain states are. Accordingly, even if (as per mental causation) a person’s
behavior is caused by her mental states rather than her physical brain, she
still would be a victim of circumstance if she falls into wrongdoing. The
only difference is that she would be, not a victim of neuronal

96.
And Professor Morse agrees that it probably cannot, see supra note 66, and any such
uncaused, self-originated forces would, of course, be a violation of the physical law of conservation.
97.
Inevitable Mind, supra note 3, at 46.
98.
Common Sense, supra note 46, at 67; Inevitable Mind, supra note 3, at 46.
99.
Common Sense, supra note 46, at 67. Inevitable Mind, supra note 3, at 46.
100. See Inevitable Mind, supra note 3, at 33; supra note 52 and accompanying text.
101. See supra notes 61–63. By definition, compatibilism means that responsibility is
compatible with determinism.
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circumstances, but a victim of mental circumstances (“VMC”). And so the
question becomes: On what basis could a neuroskeptic think it is perfectly
fine to attribute responsibility and blame to VMCs but not to VNCs? In
deciding who deserves punishment, what difference does it make that a
defendant’s wrongful conduct was ineluctably determined by her causally
efficacious mental states rather than by her neuronal activity alone? It
appears to be a flat-out contradiction to say that VMC transgressors are
punishable while mere VNCs are not, a contradiction that Professor Morse
does not try to resolve.
C. Burden of Proof
Despite the key role that the mental causation hypothesis performs in
folk psychology and the neuroskepticism position, little evidentiary
support is offered for the contention that mental causation actually
occurs.102 Professor Morse, for instance, “simply accept[s] the folk
psychological view that mental states [have] a genuinely causal role in
explaining human behavior.”103 Instead of making an effort to substantiate
this “causal role,” he preemptively assigns the burden of persuasion to
those—such as the advocates of VNC—who would contend that mental
causation does not occur.104 What is more, he sets the bar exceedingly
high, saying that the burden to disprove mental causation is “enormous”105
and that the folk-psychology model is justified until “science conclusively
demonstrates that human beings cannot be guided by reasons and that
mental states play no role in explaining behavior.”106

102. See infra Part IV.
103. Translation, supra note 3, at 532, n.5.
104. Common Sense, supra note 46, at 67. (“The burden of persuasion is firmly on proponents
of the radical [neuroscience] view”); Translation, supra note 3, at 553 (“Surely the burden of
persuasion is on those who argue [that] the VNC is true”).
105. Neurolaw, supra note 46, at 14.
106. Free Will, supra note 46, at 251 (emphasis added); see also id. at 253. Professor Morse
peppers his papers with reminders that (in his view) the burden in on neuroscience to disprove mental
causation. See, e.g., Translation, supra note 3, at 536; Neurolaw, supra note 46, at 14; Inevitable Mind,
supra note 3, at 46.
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This burden-of-persuasion argument would (if accepted) surely be
Professor Morse’s strongest and, indeed, would effectively decide the
debate. Not only has he couched the proposition to be proved in terms of a
negative, notoriously hard to prove,107 he has set the bar unreachably high:
Under one-sided ground rules like these, even an overwhelming balance of
evidence running against the mental causation hypothesis would have to
be disregarded so long as it did not quite “conclusively demonstrate … that
mental states play no role.”108 “The law will be fundamentally challenged
only if neuroscience or any other science can conclusively demonstrate
that the law’s psychology is wrong and we are not the type of creatures for
whom mental states are causally effective.”109 And, he notes, “neither
neuroscience nor any other science has demonstrated that mental states
play no independent and partial causal role.”110
Professor Morse makes no particular effort to justify his bold
rhetorical step of assigning the burden to his opponents and demanding
conclusive proof. All we get are hints of a kind of “moral inertia”
argument; for example, that “we remain entitled to presume that conscious
intentions are causal until the burden is met.”111 The problem is that he
does not say why we are “entitled” to this presumption and, as will be
discussed in Part IV, the present evidence for mental causation does not
even support a valid inference that it exists, much less a presumption.112

107. See Folk Psychology, supra note 3, at 4, n.5. Even if every instance of human behavior
ever examined by neuroscience were definitively proved to be due solely to physical brain causation, it
still could not be ruled out that, at some point in the future, a mentally-caused act might be discovered.
This is simply a standard feature of the classic problem of inductive reasoning: It can never provide
absolute certainty because we have no right to assume, in Hume’s words, that “instances of which we
have had no experience must resemble those of which we have had experience.” DAVID HUME,
TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 123 (1826). While inductive reasoning can provide high statistical
probabilities of truth (in this case that mental causation never occurs), it cannot rule out the possibility
of future counter-examples. See Leah Henderson, The Problem of Induction, STANFORD
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (2018), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/induction-problem/.
108. See supra note 106.
109. Translation, supra note 3, at 534 (emphasis added).
110. See, e.g., Translation, supra note 3, at 536.
111. Id. at 553; see also Inevitable Mind, supra note 3, at 30 (quoting Jerry Fodor); Neurolaw
supra note 46, at 14. The obvious reason for elevated burdens of proof is to “skew errors away from
defendants for policy reasons.” Ronald J. Allen & Michael S. Pardo, Relative Plausibility and Its
Critics 7 Northwestern Public Law Research Paper No. 18-16 (2018) (citing In re Winship, 397 U.S.
358, 364 (1970); Addington v. Texas, 411 U.S. 418, 424 (1979)). But this rationale suggests that, on
constitutional grounds no less, we should try to “skew errors away from” inflicting punishment, not
towards it by placing the heavy burden on those who would inflict.
112. Arguably, the burden of proof in disproving the mental-causation hypothesis should be
met simply by showing that it is a false inference that is premised on a logical fallacy, as will be
discussed infra Part IV, coupled with Eddington’s analysis showing that mental causation is virtually
impossible consistent with the physical nature of the substances involved, discussed infra III.B.
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There is of course something to be said for preserving the stability of
legal institutions,113 and this might support a degree of inertia in favor of
mental causation. But one may be forgiven for suspecting that Professor
Morse carries this idea too far. New harms require their own justifications,
and when the question is whether to inflict suffering and hardship it would
seem not to be a suitable case for woodenly applying moral rationales that
were settled for previous cases to new parties or facts. Beyond that,
requirements of conclusive proof are not well known in law—“beyond a
reasonable doubt” being as high as the burdens seem to get.114 The burden
of proof that Professor Morse has set with such apodictic aplomb appears,
at any rate, to be more a rhetorical device than a seriously supported
position.
D. The “Fundamental Psycholegal Error”
Neuroscience is concerned with facts about nature, specifically the
workings of the brain and its role in causing behavior. It does not make
normative findings concerning matters of ‘right’ and ‘wrong,’ and
normative conclusions cannot be drawn from purely physical facts.115
Therefore, as Professor Morse is fond of insisting, the causal explanations
provided by neuroscience are not normative excuses,116 and he calls it a

113. See Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1178
(1989) (“Law . . . unlike science, is concerned not only with getting the result right but also with
stability, to which it frequently will sacrifice substantive justice”); see also Holy Props. Ltd., v.
Kenneth Cole Prods., Inc., 661 N.E.2d 694 (N.Y. 1995); Estate of Thomson v. Wade, 509 N.E.2d 309
(N.Y. 1987) (“[W]here it can reasonably be assumed that settled rules are necessary and necessarily
relied upon, stability and adherence to precedent are generally more important than a better or even a
‘correct’ rule of law”).
114. Gregg Caruso discusses various possibilities and favors a high epistemic bar to prove that
free will does exist in Gregg D. Caruso, Justice Without Retribution: An Epistemic Argument Against
Retributive Criminal Punishment, NEUROETHICS (2018), https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2F
s12152-018-9357-8. Adam Kolber has discussed a standard that requires proof of key justificatory
facts beyond a reasonable doubt in order to justify punishment. Adam J. Kolber, Punishment and
Moral Risk, 2018 U. ILL. L. REV. 487, 487 (2018) (proposed and defended by Nathan Hanna in
Retributivism Revisited, 167 PHIL. STUD. 473, 477–78 (2014). With particular reference to the putative
justificatory “fact” of free will, Michael Corrado appears to take the position that there may be enough
evidence for free will to support some everyday-life decisionmaking but not enough to support
brutality as a state response to the problem of criminality. See Michael Corrado, Free Will Fallibilism
and the ‘Two Standpoints’ Account of Freedom, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2
943442; Michael Louis Corrado, Punishment and The Burden Of Proof, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/p
apers.cfm?abstract_id=2997654. In an earlier paper, I have argued that the facts supporting a claim of
justification have to be shown with “reasonable certainty—the degree of certainty that ‘ordinarily
prudent’ people require as a basis for action generally.” John Humbach, Free Will Ideology:
Experiments, Evolution and Virtue Ethics, Pace Law Faculty Publications 5 (2010),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1578445.
115. HUME, A TREATISE, supra note 107, at 469. As, noted in a previous footnote, supra note
23, nothing in the neuroscience explanation of human behavior denies the important moral distinction
between right and wrong.
116. See Overclaim, supra note 46, at 399; Inevitable Mind, supra note 3, at 47; Common
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“fundamental psycholegal error” to think they are.117 What this truth
overlooks, however, is that it is not possible to draw valid normative
judgments about conduct or about the moral rightness of punishment
without applying normative principles in the light of the actual facts. To
the extent that particular facts are relevant to such judgments, the scientific
evidence that establishes or disconfirms those facts is also relevant.118
“Evidence that challenges fundamental legal assumptions can alter the law
and its interpretation,”119 and normative reasoning premised on out-of-date
or faulty factual assumptions is unlikely to provide sound results.
Therefore, when scientific research uncovers norm-relevant facts that were
not previously known, or throws doubt on suppositions previously thought
to be true, it will probably be necessary to change the factual premises to
which our normative principles are applied.120 If normative analysis does
not use the best factual understandings available, its conclusions will
surely go awry.
For example, Professor Morse contends that offenders deserve
hardship and deprivation because they are, as persons, considered to be
“agents” able to act intentionally and for reasons.121 But no matter how
sound this “agency” justification for punishment may be as a normative
matter (a point I will not debate for the moment), it cannot be treated as
applicable if its factual predicates—agency and mental causation—are
false. Or, to take another example, even though causal explanations are not
in themselves excuses, they still can be relevant to excuses if they negate
the presence of a key element of the alleged offense,122 such as specific
intent123 or the usual requirement of a voluntary act.124
Thus, while it may be tempting to cast aside the evidence of
neuroscience on the ground that it tells us only about the “causes” of
behavior and not about norms of ‘right’ and ‘wrong,’ this argument misses
the point. To the extent that justifications for current criminal justice

Sense, supra note 46, at 55.
117. Id. Apparently, although causal explanations are not exculpatory (“excuses”), Professor
Morse is happy enough to treat them as inculpatory. Specifically, he appears to fully accept the idea
that people can be held morally responsible and punished based on the fact their mental states, such as
intentions, caused their wrongful conduct. Why mental-state causal explanations of behavior are
relevant to culpability and brain state explanations are not is a contradiction that is never explained.
118. See Kolber, NeuroLaw Revolution?, supra note 48, at 822 (“[A]nalogizing the relevance
of facts about chemicals to norms regulating the handling of the substances).
119. Id.
120. See Jones & Wagner, supra note 8, at 10 (but does not mention challenging the
assumption of mental causation).
121. See supra notes 52–55.
122. See Common Sense, supra note 46, at 53.
123. United States v. Veach, 455 F.3d 628 (6th Cir. 2006); MODEL PENAL CODE 2.01(1).
124. See supra notes 12–13.
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practices are premised on beliefs in mental causation, the facticity of
mental causation is not just relevant but crucial to those justifications. By
showing that human behavior can be best explained by entirely physical
causes, without any need to suppose the agency and mental causes that are
essential to moral and (under many current laws) legal culpability, a key
justification for inflicting human hardship and deprivation will be lost.125
Even Professor Morse appears to concede this.126
III. THE NEUROSCIENCE THREAT
According to the folk psychology implicit in criminal law, mental
states are “fundamental to a full causal explanation and understanding of
human action.”127 Based on the findings of neuroscience to date, however,
it has already become increasingly doubtful that mental causation is even
possible let alone fundamental to an explanation of why people do what
they do. To the extent that mental-causation beliefs are the basis for the
moral legitimacy of blame, ascribing responsibility and inflicting
punishment, neuroscience threatens these practices with a failure of their
fundamental premise. By providing a credible and well-documented
alternative to the mental-causation hypothesis, the findings of
neuroscience strike directly at the factual presuppositions underlying the
“guilty mind” justifications for inflicting hardship and deprivation on
millions of Americans. As such, they appear to require a fundamental
rethinking of the criminal law and justice practices.128

125. See Roskies, supra note 28, at 419 (“[D]eterminism is a threat to moral responsibility
when the causes of behavior are perceived to bypass mental states”).
126. See, e.g., Inevitable Mind, supra note 3, at 46 (“It is an incoherent notion to have genuine
responsibility without agency,” i.e., the ability to act based on intentions and reasons”). Obviously,
society would continue to need to take coercive measures against dangerous individuals in the interest
of public safety. But insofar as the mental-causation hypothesis is the basis for holding that offenders
“deserve” hardship and deprivation, the entire approach to criminal justice may need to be revised. The
nature of the coercive treatment would likely be entirely different (and vastly less inhumane) if it were
seen as merely a necessary and regrettable expedient, rather than a meting out of deserved adverse
consequences.
So while facilities for confinement would surely still exist, for incapacitation and as places for
rehabilitation. But people would not be sent to these facilities because they “deserve” it but rather
because the dangers and risks of the alternatives are simply too socially intolerable to allow. The
mission of these facilities would be crime-prevention, not “punishment”; they would be used as a last
resort not a default response; and most importantly, they would be designed to actively minimize
rather than accentuate the inevitable hardship and deprivation that comes with loss of freedom
imposed for the protection of others. See infra Part VI.
127. Free Will, supra note 46, at 255; see also Common Sense, supra note 46, at 50;
Translation, supra note 3, at 530.
128. But cf. Translation, supra note 3, at 532–34. Just to be clear again, I make no suggestion
that there would (or should) be an end to legal consequences for crime. See supra note 126 and infra
Part VI.
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Neuroscience has created serious doubts about the mental-causation
hypothesis in a number of ways; three will be elaborated on here. First,
modern neuroscience research provides a documented and robust
competitor to folk-psychology’s mental causation conjecture, which
therefore can no longer prevail simply by default. Second, despite
extensive neuroscience investigations that would be expected to have
turned up some sign of mental causation if it exists, or at least a gap into
which it could fit, no such sign or gap has been observed. Thirdly, if
mental states like intentions, reasons and beliefs are actually able to cause
the body to move, it would flatly contradict the “physicalism” thesis that
underlies our general understanding of everything else we know to exist in
the natural Universe. These will be considered in turn.
A. Neuroscience Is a Documented Alternative to the Folk-Psychology
Conjecture
For thousands of years, the mental-causation hypothesis had no
credible competitors.129 People in the pre-scientific world had no clue (and
certainly no evidence) that bodily movements could be produced by
neuronal activity alone. They therefore had no choice but to suppose that
their mental intentions caused their movements and behavior or else have
no causal theory at all. Today’s accumulation of evidence detailing the
mechanics of neuronal causation threatens the mental-causation hypothesis
by putting an end to its explanational monopoly. The old folk-psychology
conjectures can no longer prevail simply by default.
As already noted, Professor Morse has attempted to parry this threat
by preemptively assigning the burden of persuasion to those who contend
that mental causation does not occur,130 requiring “science [to]
conclusively demonstrate . . . that mental states play no role in explaining
behavior.”131 And, he points out, “neither neuroscience nor any other

129. There were, to be sure, attempts to suggest competing theories, such as Malebranche’s
“occasionalism” according to which God creates successive states of the world from moment to
moment and the differences between these successive states gives an illusion of causation, including
mental causation. Tad M. Schmaltz, Nicolas Malebranche, in A COMPANION TO EARLY MODERN
PHILOSOPHY 152, 161 (Steven Nadler, ed. 2007); STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY, Nicolas
Malebranche § 4 (2013), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/malebranche/#Occ (“God . . . brings it
about that our sensations and volitions are correlated with motions in our body”). Leibnitz provided
another competing explanation arguing that “the mind and the body are in a ‘pre-established harmony,’
rather like the clocks that were synchronized by the shopkeeper in the morning, with God having
started off our minds and bodies in a harmonious relationship.” See JAEGWON KIM, PHILOSOPHY
OF MIND 171 (2011); Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz § 4.4 (2013), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/leibniz/
#PreEstHa. But these alternative explanations never gained much traction.
130. See supra Part II.C.
131. Free Will, supra note 46, at 251 (emphasis added); see also id. at 253. Professor Morse
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science has demonstrated that mental states play no independent and
partial causal role.”132 The threat that neuroscience poses cannot, however,
be so easily dismissed. An explanation cannot be ruled out just because it
does not rule out its rival explanation. When people are faced with
competing explanatory possibilities, whether in science or in law, the
outcome should not depend (if we care about truth) on one side’s preemptive assignment of an overwhelming burden of proof to the other. It
should depend, rather, on which of the alternatives best lines up with the
relevant evidence and data. The question is almost never which alternative
perfectly fits the evidence (which often will be neither), but which one
makes the best fit.133 But each remains a possibility, tugging at the honest
mind until there is an evenhanded comparative evaluation of the evidence
supporting both. The question of which inference provides the best
explanation of human behavior, mental causation or causation by the
brain, will be considered infra Part V.
B. No Sign of Mental Causation in Experimental Findings
If mental causation actually has a role in producing behavior, the
growing accumulation of experimental findings134 would be expected to
reveal some sign of it or, at least, some “gap” in neuroscience’s causal
explanations that mental causation could fill. Yet no sign of any such
causation by the mind (or of any other form of psychokinesis) has ever
turned up, and mental causation is quite unnecessary to a complete
neuroscience picture of the mechanics of behavior production.135 Not only
are there no experimental results that show mental states modifying or
affecting patterns of neuronal activity or triggering motor impulses to the
body, there is nothing to show how they even could.136 On the contrary,
what the evidence shows is that human beings and all other organisms
with brains can produce coordinated, situation-responsive bodily
movements and, hence, behavior, by means of neuronal activity alone. To
be sure, mere “absence of evidence is not evidence of absence,” as the

peppers his papers with reminders that (in his view) the burden in on neuroscience to disprove mental
causation. See, e.g., Translation, supra note 3, at 536; Neurolaw, supra note 46, at 14; Inevitable Mind,
supra note 3, at 46.
132. Translation, supra note 3, at 536.
133. See infra Part V.
134. See supra note 4 (1.79 million published articles from 2009 to 2013 alone).
135. David Papineau has called this general line of reasoning the “argument from physiology.”
David Papineau, The Rise of Physicalism, in PHYSICALISM AND ITS DISCONTENTS (Carl Gillett &
Barry M. Loewer eds., 2001), https://www.academia.edu/819823/The_Rise_of_Physicalism.
136. Indeed, it is a seriously open question whether most organisms, though often capable of
complex behavioral repertoires in response to wide variations in their environments, even have minds
or “mental states” as understood to exist in human beings.

https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol11/iss2/5

2019]

MENTAL CAUSATION FALLACY

219

saying goes. But as the experimental data continues to mount up with no
sign of mental causation, this “dog that did not bark”137 creates an
increasingly powerful implication that mental states have no causal role in
generating bodily movements or behavior.
One key problem that neuroscience raises for the mental-causation
hypothesis is that it seems to rule out, as impossibly causally intrusive, the
existence of a mind-brain interface through which the “intentional”
contents of mental states could be communicated to the muscle-activating
motor neurons. Neuroskeptics do not seem to deny that coordinated
contractions of striated muscles (and hence behavior) can only be triggered
by electrical signals arriving through motor neurons connecting to the
brain and central nervous system. So if there were a mind-brain interface
that inserts mental decisions into the neuronal processes creating motor
signals, how might it work?
This is actually not a new question: As physicist Arthur Eddington
wrote as early as 1927,138 a mental decision can cause bodily movement
only if, somewhere in the brain, “the course of behavior of certain atoms
or elements of the physical world is directly determined for them by the
mental decision.”139 He considered two main classes of possibilities for
this intervention: It could occur if the mind could have effects on one or a
small number of atoms and “serve as a switch to deflect the material world
from one course to another.”140 Or it could occur if the mind could
systematically affect a “large groups of atoms”141 that operate as the
components of neurons, as entire neurons or even as larger brain
structures. Neither possibility, he concluded, could likely be compatible
with physical law.
Eddington noted that the first possible mode of mental-state
intervention (individual-atom effects) could at least theoretically occur
without obvious contradiction of physical laws. This is because the
apparent determinism of cause and effect that we see at the macro level
does not apply at the sub-microscopic “quantum” level of atoms and
subatomic particles, where apparently uncaused events are

137. Mike Skotnicki, “The Dog that Didn’t Bark:” What We Can Learn from Sir Arthur Conan
Doyle About Using the Absence of Expected Facts, BRIEFLY WRITING (July 25, 2012),
https://brieflywriting.com/2012/07/25/the-dog-that-didnt-bark-what-we-can-learn-from-sir-arthurconan-doyle-about-using-the-absence-of-expected-facts/
138. ARTHUR EDDINGTON, THE NATURE OF THE PHYSICAL WORLD 281 (Cambridge Univ.
Press 1928), http://henry.pha.jhu.edu/Eddington.2008.pdf. Eddington wrote in terms of causation by
“volitions,” but what we are calling mental causation is evidently what he had in view.
139. Id. at 312.
140. Id. at 312.
141. Id. at 312–13.
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commonplace.142 Since events at the quantum level can only be foreseen in
terms statistical probabilities anyway, a mental decision could conceivably
intervene to “deflect” physical events and not be noticed because the
mind-body interaction would not, in the given instance, be experimentally
distinguishable from random quantum variation.143 As Eddington went on
to point out, however, from a physics standpoint the precise balancing of
forces required for this “key-atoms” model of brain operation would be
“impossible to maintain” because of the inherent instabilities that result
from “physical influences of temperature and promiscuous collision.”144
The alternative possibility for mental-state intervention (mental
decisions “systematically affect large groups of atoms”) has major
difficulties of its own:
It is one thing to allow the mind to direct an atom between two
courses neither of which would be improbable for an inorganic
atom; it is another thing to allow it to direct a crowd of atoms into a
configuration which . . . physics would set aside as ‘too
improbable.’145
He said it would be “like the improbability of the atoms finding
themselves by chance all in one half of the vessel.”146 This improbability,
which is vanishingly close to zero, also represents the likelihood that the
mental causation hypothesis is true.
It is notable, perhaps, that Eddington himself was no crusader against
the mental causation hypothesis. He clearly wanted to believe that there is
a causally active place for human “volition” in nature. He argued, for
example, that it might be possible to break the vast improbability of mindbody interaction (which he had demonstrated) by considering the “broader
unifying trends in the mind-stuff,” trends that could lead to “collective
behavior” of atoms in response to impinging mental decisions.147 But
Eddington offered no real evidence that any such process could occur and,
in the end, his analysis of the mind-brain interface is about as close as
science gets to ruling out, once and for all, the possibility of mental-state
causation. And it seems very close indeed. Based on the Eddington’s

142. Id. at 299–311.
143. Indeed, Eddington even proposed that, perhaps, the natural probabilities themselves could
be modified by mental decisions. Id. at 314.
144. Id. at 313.
145. EDDINGTON, supra note 138, at 314.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 315. Eddington’s hoped-for alternative sounds essentially like a repackaging of
traditional beliefs that the soul can affect the course physical events, with “mind-stuff” standing in for
the more traditional “soul.” Descartes, for example, regarded the mind and the soul as more or less the
same thing. Justin Skirry, René Descartes: The Mind-Body Distinction, INTERNET ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PHILOSOPHY, https://www.iep.utm.edu/descmind/
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analysis there is no plausible way, even in theory, that the content of
mental states could affect neuronal processes. Rather, mental states are
essentially Platonic148 cave-shadows cast by the physical, no more able to
direct the course human conduct than the shadow of a bat can knock a ball
across a field.
C. Mental Causation Contradicts the Physicalist View of the Universe
Another way that the findings of neuroscience threaten the belief in
mental causation is by highlighting its apparent inconsistency with the
precepts of physicalism, the thesis that (apart from abstract concepts)
“everything is physical”149 and, in particular, its corollary that every
physical event, if it has a cause, must have a physical cause.150 Physicalism
is, in other words, the view of the Universe that rejects the idea that
physical objects can be moved around or modified by non-physical forces,
such as ghosts, spirits or immaterial minds.

148. Plato, REPUBLIC VII 514a (allegory of the cave).
149. See generally Daniel Stoljar, Physicalism, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY
(2015), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/physicalism/#TokTypPhy. The basic premise of physicalism
is that all of the concrete stuff of universe consists of physical matter and energy, and of nothing else.
Id. Jaegwon Kim describes physicalism as “the view that there are no concrete substances, in the
space-time world other than material particles and their aggregates.” Jaegwon Kim, PHILOSOPHY OF
THE MIND 211 (1998) (referring specifically to “ontological physicalism” or, as he prefers to call it,
“substance physicalism”).
For what it is worth, while I generally accept the truth of ontological physicalism, I do not see
how such a commitment can be unqualified as long as the nature of consciousness remains unknown.
See following footnote and the companion to this article, The Neuroskeptic’s Physicalism Dilemma,
12 WASH. U. JUR. REV. ___ (forthcoming) [hereinafter Humbach, Physicalism Dilemma].
150. This latter is sometimes referred to as the “causal closure principle.” See KIM,
PHYSICALISM, supra note 15, at 15. Notice that neither physicalism per se nor the causal closure
principle holds that every physical event has a cause, but we generally assume that (except at the
quantum level) they do. Notice, too, that while uncertainties about the nature of consciousness may
require reservations in our commitment to physicalism, see previous footnote, it by no means requires
reservations concerning the “causal closure principle.” It is, for example, perfectly coherent to think
that conscious mental states have a non-physical nature (as it would be, for example, if they are nonphysical properties of physical events in the brain—so-called property dualism) without also
supposing them to have causal efficacy in the physical domain. It is perfectly possible, in other words,
that mental states are non-physical but epiphenomenal—i.e., causally inert. For more on “property
dualism,” discussed infra note 156 and PHYSICALISM DILEMMA, supra note 149.
There is not, of course, conclusive proof that the causal closure principle is true—though
everything we know about the Universe (apart from possible mental causation) implies that it is. And
one cannot in any case “disprove” mental causation merely by asserting that it is inconsistent with
causal closure without blatantly begging the question. What one can do, however, is question whether
it is credible that a Universe whose ontology is otherwise so consistently physical throughout would
include, in one just-evolved species on one little planet orbiting one very minor star, there would be
such a glaring exception to an otherwise universal law that spirits, phantoms and other immaterial
forces cannot effect changes in physical reality. There are many things unique and special about the
Earth, humanity and terrestrial life but an ability to violate physical law is not known to be among
them.
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The neuroscience explanation of behavior (human and otherwise) is
uncompromisingly physicalist in character. It provides a detailed and
evidence-based explanation, based on ordinary physical principles, of how
neuronal activity can determine and produce bodily movements
(behavior), not just in human beings but in every kind of organism having
a brain.151 In contrast to the mental causation hypothesis, which argues that
human behavior is produced by a process that is appears to be literally
unique in nature, the neuroscience explanation of behavior treats the things
that people do as an ordinary part of the physical order.
While believers in mental causation must concede it is an utter
mystery how intentions, reasons and other mental states could possibly
cause the muscular contractions that bring about movement,152
neuroscientists see behavior causation as a matter of ordinary physical
forces, the kind that are studied in high-school physics: It is a
commonplace that channeled currents of electrical forces can carry and
process information as well as produce mechanical motion, something that
we see all around us every day as the basis for just about everything that
makes our modern lifestyles possible, from automatic dishwashers to the
control systems of space rockets. Relying on these electrical and
electromotive causes and effects, the same kinds of causal interactions that
are practically ubiquitous in today’s world, biochemically-generated
electric currents carry information and process it computationally as the
currents are channeled within the neural networks of the brain’s
connectome by differently-strengthed (potentiated) neural synapses,153
thereby producing and organizing the motor impulses that cause people
and other organisms to do what they do.154 As far as neuroscience is

151. See SAPOLSKY, supra, note 6, at 21–77, 535–36 (describing and summarizing how the
brain chooses and produces bodily movements); see also PASSINGHAM, supra note 4, at 66–81.
152. See Inevitable Mind, supra note 3, at 33 (“[W]e do not have a clue”); Moore on the Mind,
supra note 46, at 4 (“The brain enables the mind and action, but we have no idea how”); LawSci, supra
note 37, at 24. Professor Morse writes that it should be the “task of neuroscience” to explain how
mental states cause action (“agency”), “not to explain it away reductively.” Common Sense, supra note
46, at 47. But this charge to neuroscience begs the question of whether mental states cause action. It is
the task of neuroscience to explain how human behavior is produced, but not to show how a particular
pre-chosen cause of behavior, favored on policy, religious or grounds might be able to produces it.
153. See generally KOLB & WINSHAW, supra note 6, at 109–57, 164–70; PASSINGHAM, supra
note 4, at 66–81; SAPOLSKY, supra, note 6, at 21–77, 535–36 (describing and summarizing how the
brain chooses and produces bodily movements); and other sources cited supra note 6.
154. It is not, to be sure, a simple matter to map the connectome or study how differentlystrengthed synapses channel electrical forces through its neural networks. But no one asserts, I think,
that sequences of synaptic firings in the brain are willy-nilly or denies that there are traceable
“pathways” which nervous impulses follow through the complex and plastic circuitry of the brain, or
that these patterns of excitation run (and are roughly traceable) from the sensory organs through the
areas of the pre-frontal cortex (among others) to the motor neurons that activate muscular movements.
See KOLB & WINSHAW, supra note 6, at 109–57, 164–70. It is, however, beside the point that no one
can know what a given brain will do at a given moment or in a given situation. It could likewise be
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concerned, human behavior, like everything else that happens within the
fabric of the Universe, results from interactions among bits of matter and
energy in accordance with physical law, not from conscious mental states.
One can quibble that physicalism is not (yet) able to explain
everything,155 but that is hardly a justification for favoring a non-physical
causal explanation of events when a physical one is plausible. A bump in
the attic at night makes most of us think that something tipped over, not of
spirits and ghosts. When mental causation’s imaginative contrivances like
“property dualism,”156 emergentism157 and the irreducibility of mental
causes158 are contrasted with the scientific building blocks of the
neuroscience explanation of behavior, it is difficult to see the mentalcausation hypothesis as anything but an ontological outlier—an
intrinsically non-material explanation of a kind that is generally eschewed
in modern mainstream scholarship.159

said that no one can say what pattern a kaleidoscope will show after fifty turns of the wheel. But that
does not give reason to doubt (in either case) that what is going on is a purely physical process dictated
by purely physical laws.
155. A notable example is consciousness itself. See supra notes 35–36; PHYSICALISM
DILEMMA, supra note 149.
156. Property dualism is the idea that physical events can have non-physical properties that
cannot be fully explained by the properties of the underling physical substrate itself. See KIM,
PHYSICALISM, supra note 15, at 20–22, 156–61; Howard Robinson, Dualism, STANFORD
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 2.2 (2016), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/dualism/#ProDua. For
example, a painting of a park in Paris may physically consist of nothing but blobs of dried pigment on
a stretched cloth; nonetheless, the image can have properties, such as eye-appeal, artistic balance or
meaning, that cannot be entirely accounted for solely by reference to the physical laws governing the
atoms that comprise the blobs of paint and cloth. Property dualism is posited to avoid the trap of
“substance dualism,” the now generally discredited theory of Descartes that mind and body are two
different substances. See KIM, PHYSICALISM, supra note 15, at 156 (“Applied to the present context,
substance dualism posits the existence of both physical bodies and nonphysical minds whereas
physicalism admits the existence only of physical objects and processes”). Unlike substance dualism,
property dualism accepts that there is only one substance—the physical—but it finds hope for mental
causation in the idea that physical substances, such as arrangements of atoms, can have non-physical
properties, such as consciousness (just as the painting Paris may have non-physical properties such as
beauty and meaning).
157. Emergentism is a form of property dualism which holds that certain arrangements of
atoms can give rise to discernible objects and properties whose behavior cannot be entirely accounted
for by the properties of the atoms themselves, for example, arrangements of dots can be viewed as a
picture that has properties over and above the properties of the dots themselves, or certain
arrangements of atoms or neural firings can give rise to conscious states with properties over and
above those of the atoms or neural firings themselves. Id. at 157–58 (“In addition to physical
properties [of the substance of the brain], there are physically irreducible domains of emergent
properties, of which mental properties are the leading candidates.”).
158. In this context, “irreducible causes” refers to the idea that the causation of events by
mental states cannot reduced to underlying physical causes on the theory that mental-state causes are
not merely physical in nature but are something that cannot quite be captured in physical terms. See
Susan Haack, Brave New World: On Nature, Culture, and the Limits of Reductionism, in EXPLAINING
THE MIND 37 (Bartosz Brozek et al. eds., 2019); PHYSICALISM DILEMMA, supra note 149.
159. Notably, although property dualism, emergentism and irreducibility (non-reductive
physicalism) all can, to be sure, be useful as ways of characterizing reality for various purposes, none
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IV. THE EVIDENCE FOR MENTAL CAUSATION
A. The Inference from Introspection
There is not much to say about the evidence for mental causation
because there is so little of it. Indeed, there is no evidence at all as to how
intentions or other mental states (as distinct from co-occurring brain
activity) could inject themselves into chains of physical cause and effect to
produce bodily movements.160 Not only is there no evidence as to what the
“mind” consists of or how mental states come into being,161 there is
nothing whatever that shows how the immaterial mind (as opposed to a
biomechanical brain), could possibly do the things it is supposed to do
such as think, classify, compare, recall, reason, direct behavior and so on.
Our understanding of the ontological nature of the mind, as opposed to the
brain, has advanced little beyond the stage it had reached when (still often
called the “soul”162) it was pondered by Descartes and Pascal.163 Rather,

of them entails the possibility that mental states have the power to modify the course of physical
reality. Their primary usefulness for present purposes is, therefore, only to assert that a physicalist
outlook does not rule out mental causation. They do nothing to affirmatively establish that it exists in
the first place. All are discussed at greater length in PHYSICALISM DILEMMA, supra note 149.
160. See supra notes 138–48. The parenthetical “as distinct from co-occurring brain activity”
denotes that I am setting aside for the moment arguments that mental causation exists in the sense that
mental states can be seen to partake of the causal powers of underlying brain states either because the
mental states are identical to the brain states or because they are “supervenient” on them. See KIM,
PHYSICALISM, supra note 15, at 93–147 (describing and critiquing such arguments). For one thing, that
sort of piggy-back mental causation does not seem to correspond to the law’s conception of mental
states’ distinct role in criminal behavior (“distinct” from the physical elements, or actus reus, of
crimes). That is, when the law speaks of a person’s intentions, knowledge, recklessness or other mental
states, it is not referring to something in the person’s physical makeup or features of her neuronal
physiology. Rather, the law’s conception of intentions and other mental states refers to states of
conscious awareness that are in their essence not physical (i.e., not fully “reducible” to purely physical
components such as the physical neuronal networks of the brain and body). See Inevitable Mind, supra
note 3, at 34.
A more important reason for setting aside piggy-back mental causation is that mental states
whose effects identically mirror the effects of physical states on which they depend would seem to
have no distinctive moral significance for purposes of moral responsibility. Even if such mental states
could be properly said to have causal effect, they would seem to add nothing to the causal picture. If
the underlying physical-causation events alone do not suffice to justify ascribing responsibility and
inflicting punishment, then neither would the causally redundant mental states that shadow them. For a
physicalist, moreover, they would be excluded as causes by the exclusion principle, which forbids that
sort of misleading double-counting and misattribution of causes. For further discussion of the
exclusion principle, see infra note 198 and PHYSICALISM DILEMMA, supra note 149.
161. See Inevitable Mind, supra note 3, at 33 (“[W]e do not have a clue”) and other authorities
cited supra note 152. Professor Morse attempts to finesse this absence of evidence by declaring it is
the “task of neuroscience” to explain how mental states cause action (“agency”), “not to explain it
away reductively.” Common Sense, supra note 46, at 47. But in assigning this task to neuroscience, he
begs the question of whether mental states cause action. To be sure, it is the task of neuroscience to
explain how human behavior is produced, and it does, but there is no reason to think neuroscience is
required to show how the mind is able to produce it. See also notes 35–37.
162. As Descartes wrote: “I consider the mind not as a part of the soul, but as the whole soul
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mental causation is largely understood as essentially a type of intra-body
psychokinesis, something that just happens when non-physical forces of
“intention” and “reasons” emanate from conscious awareness and
intervene in ordinary physical interactions, changing the course of events.
Wittgenstein noted this problem of pinning down the causes of bodily
movements when he wrote, in a passage that Professor Morse is fond of
quoting164:
Let us not forget this: when ‘I raise my arm’, my arm goes up. And
the problem arises: what is left over if I subtract the fact that my
arm goes up from the fact that I raise my arm?165
The answer given by neuroscience would be, of course, that what is
“left over” are muscle contractions prompted by neuronal activity in the
brain and central nervous system (or, more elaborately, by successions of
coordinated firings of synapses in populations of neurons that initiate166
and organize167 muscle-activating motor signals that are sent through
motor neurons to the arm).168 While Wittgenstein did not mention brain
states and neuronal firing as possible causes of bodily movements (he
wrote before the era of modern neuroscience), he was clear that he did not
believe it was the “will” that caused his arm to rise. “[W]illing.” he wrote,
“is merely an experience,” 169 perhaps “kinesthetic sensations,”170 but not
an “instrument” to bring about bodily movement.171 Despite careful

that thinks.” Robert Pasnau, The Mind-Soul Problem, in MIND, COGNITION AND REPRESENTATION:
THE TRADITION OF COMMENTARIES ON ARTITOTLE’S DE ANIMA 4 (Bakker & Thijssen, eds. 2007).
163. See Florence M. Weinberg, The Idea of the Soul in Descartes and Pascal, 8 FRENCH
FORUM 5 (1983).
164. E.g., Morse, Common Sense, supra note 46, at 59; Morse, Neurolaw, supra note 46, at 5;
Morse, Free Will, supra note 46, at 258; Morse, LawSci, supra note 37, at 23.
165. LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS ¶ 621. (G.E.M. Ancombe
trans. 1953) [hereinafter WITTGENSTEIN, INVESTIGATIONS]. Wittgenstein’s main point seems to have
been that, semantically, the difference between ‘I raise my arm’ and ‘my arm goes up’ is that the first
statement identifies who or what raised Wittgenstein’s arm while the second one does not. However,
Professor Morse quotes the passage perhaps thinking it is suggestive of the idea that “what is left over”
is mental causation, though the overall tenor of Wittgenstein’s remarks in situ are, if anything, exactly
the opposite. See infra notes 169–72.
166. Probably in either the prefrontal cortex or the posterior striatum along with the medial
parietal cortex, depending on whether the action was novel or habitual, respectively. See PASSINGHAM,
supra note 4, at 67–72.
167. Typically, in the various motor areas (premotor areas, motor cortex and supplementary
motor cortex). Id.
168. PASSINGHAM, supra note 4, at 66–81; SAPOLSKY, supra, note 6, at 21–77, 535–36,
describing and summarizing how the brain chooses and produces bodily movements; and other sources
cited supra note 6.
169. WITTGENSTEIN, INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 165, at ¶ 611 (emphasis added).
170. Id. at ¶ 621.
171. Id. at ¶ 614; see also id. at ¶ 615. (“Willing, when not meant as a kind of wish, must be the
action itself. It cannot come to a stop before the action.”) Trans by author. In this, Wittgenstein echoes
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introspection, Wittgenstein never reported that he ever detected any
specific sensation of mental causation itself. Neither, to my knowledge,
has anyone else.172
It may come as a surprise to some to hear there is so little evidence for
mental causation. After all, as Professor Morse writes, “virtually every
neurologically intact human being takes for granted . . . the subjective
experience of first person agency, the experience of mental causation that
my bodily movements and thoughts are caused, roughly speaking, by my
intentions.”173 In statements such as this, the suggestion is made that there
is a veritable mountain of evidence for mental causation, based on
potentially billions of first-person reports. There is, however, a serious
problem with this introspective “evidence” of mental causation.
The problem is that, even conceding the reliability of introspection, it
is almost surely an overclaim to speak of the “the experience of mental
causation” itself. The fact that every “intact human being” has a subjective
experience of agency—the feeling of “I did it”—does not mean anyone
ever directly experiences or observes the mental-causation event itself.
Indeed, as David Hume pointed out, probably irrefutably, no one ever
directly experiences or observes any kind of causal event in itself: There is
no kind of causation that we can ever know directly from experience
alone.174 When a causal event occurs, the only events that are experienced
in conscious awareness are the events that bracket the causal event, not the
“power or necessary connexion . . . [or] quality, which binds the effect to
the cause.”175 In the case of mental causation, therefore, it is almost certain
that all anyone ever directly experiences are the events that happen before,
and then after, the supposed mental-cause interaction occurs. To be more
specific, the most that “every neurologically intact human being” actually
experiences is: (1) a consciousness of intentions, reasons or other similar

Schopenhauer. I ARTHUR SCHOPENHAUER, THE WORLD AS WILL AND REPRESENTATION 100–02
(E.F.J. trans. 1968) (1859) [hereinafter SCHOPENHAUER, THE WORLD].
172. See Moore, What Is the Sense of Agency, supra note 78, for an illuminating discussion. I
am for the moment deferring discussion of the “sense of agency” that often accompanies voluntary
bodily movements. See infra notes 185–92 and accompanying text.
173. Morse, Inevitable Mind, supra note 3, at 34–35. See also Morse, Translation, supra note
3, at 551 (“Virtually every neurologically intact person consistently has the experience of first-person
agency, the experience that one's intentions flow from one's desires and beliefs and result in action”).
Professor Morse also likes to quote Jerry Fodor to the effect that, if we are wrong about these
assumptions, “it's the wrongest we've ever been about anything except belief in the supernatural.” See,
e.g., Morse, Inevitable Mind, supra note 3, at 30; Morse, Neurolaw, supra note 46, at 14. The
weakness of this sort of ipse dixit argument does not require comment—and this is quite apart from the
irony that, based on the physical evidence we have, it appears that belief in mental causation is a belief
in the supernatural.
174. DAVID HUME, AN ENQUIRY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING 60 [Sec. VII Pt. I ¶ 6]
1988) (1748); [hereinafter HUME, ENQUIRY]; see also Saunders, supra note 13, at 454 n.48.
175. HUME, ENQUIRY, supra note 174, at 60 [Sec. VII Pt. I ¶ 6].
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mental states relating to possible bodily movements in the immediate
future, and then (2) a consciousness of bodily movements that occur
immediately following such mental states, that seem to correspond to
them, and that apparently have no other cause. In other words, while there
is direct conscious awareness of experiences that bracket the moment
when mental causation is supposed to occur, no one ever observes the
actual causal interaction itself. And, a fortiori, no one ever introspectively
observes whether that interaction is an event of mental causation or is,
rather, purely a sequence of neuronal events.
The epistemic challenge posed by fact that people never experience a
mental-causation interaction directly is not, as already noted,176 something
that is unique to mental causation (as opposed to other causation), but the
epistemic challenge posed by mental causation goes even deeper. Not only
does no one ever observe the “power or necessary connexion” of mental
causation itself but no one ever even observes any events in which a
mental-causation interaction could be embedded—in the way, for
example, that one can observe a billiard ball knock another ball across the
table. In the case of the billiard balls, we may never see the ultimately
causative subatomic forces at work imparting energy from one ball to the
other, but we at least can observe the physical interaction in which those
forces could work. We can, in other words, observe the general
mechanism of the causation. From this knowledge of mechanism plus the
before-and-after facts, we can reasonably infer that the causal event
occurred. With mental causation, however, it is as though we see the first
billiard ball approach the second, then see the second ball scoot away, but
never see or hear the causal event of impact, the event where the causal
forces are in operation.177 It is as if, watching a movie, several critical
frames have been cut out between the depiction of the cause and depiction
of the effect, so we can only infer that there was a connection between the
two. Thus, when we experience our own intentions to act, and then our
bodily movements, the best we can do is make an inference of mental
causation based on these two bits of information—the experience of what
went before (the intentions) and of what came after (the corresponding
movements).178 Mental causation is a story we tell to connect the two

176. See supra 174–75.
177. Professor Morse cites an experiment demonstrating that people are unable to discern
whether their actions were caused by their intentions or by something else. See Morse, Translation,
supra note 3, at 548 n.31. This experiment provides empirical support for the hypothesis that people do
not reliably observe or otherwise experience a causal connection between their intentions and their
actions—at least not under the conditions of the experiment.
178. At noted above, I am for the moment deferring discussion of the “sense of agency” that
often accompanies voluntary bodily movements. See infra notes 185–92 and accompanying text.
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percepts, but it is still just a story—not a percept.
There is, however, a big problem with relying on this inference of
mental causation that is based solely on what went before and what came
after. A case for mental causation that rests on this inference is premised
on a logical fallacy. The fallacy is post hoc ergo propter hoc (literally,
“after this, therefore on account of this”).179 It is logically fallacious to
infer that mental causation occurs based solely on the fact that bodily
movements are observed to follow conscious mental states that prefigure
the movements. The post hoc inference is a “false cause”180 fallacy. It is
“inherently mistaken”181 and not valid.182

179. Leo Groarke, Informal Logic, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (2017),
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logic-informal/; Hans Hansen, Fallacies, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF PHILOSOPHY (2015), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/fallacies/.
180. Bradley Dowden, Fallacies, INTERNET ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY.
http://www.iep.utm.edu/fallacy/#FalseCause.
181. Hansen, supra note 179. One of the reasons it is inherently mistaken is that, even if there
is a regular temporal correlation between the two kinds of events, this correlation may be due other
facts that in no way involve a cause-and-effect relationship between them. For example, the correlation
might be due to the fact that the two events both have the same cause or causes, and such a “commoncausation” possibilities are not infrequent. See Jaegwon Kim, Causation and Mental Causation, in
CONTEMPORARY DEBATE IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIND 7 (Brian McLaughlin & Jonathan Cohen
eds., 2007) http://www.colbud.hu/bloewer/Kim_Causation_and_Mental_Causation_-_Debates-1.pdf.
Indeed, as will emerge in later discussion, the best explanation for the observed temporal relation
between mental states and actions is that both the mental states and the actions depend on a third
factor, namely, physical brains states.
182. It should be noted that the post hoc fallacy problem infecting judgments about mental
causations is not the same as (and is far more serious than) the general problem of establishing
causation that was famously illuminated by David Hume, who argued, probably irrefutably, that that
the existence of causation as such can never be known from experience alone. See Saunders, supra
note 13, at 454 n.48. According to Hume, we can observe correlations and “constant conjunctions”
among events, but causation per se is never actually observed. See e.g., HUME, ENQUIRY, supra note
174, at 36 [Sec. IV Pt. II, ¶ 3] (“[I]f you insist, that the [causal] inference is made by a chain of
reasoning, I desire you to produce that reasoning”). While Hume’s insight is important, it is vulnerable
to the objection, made by Immanuel Kant, namely, that it leads to a conclusion in which “the very
notion of a cause would entirely disappear.” IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON at
Introduction, II (1781). For purposes of the discussion at hand, however, it will be assumed that “the
very notion of cause” has not disappeared, that events definitely can generate or produce the
occurrence of other events, and that the question is, rather, whether in any given instance there is in
fact a causal relationship.
As a practical matter, the way to show whether a causal relationship exists is normally to
demonstrate that, in addition a brute correlation, the putatively causal event is comprised of smaller
component events (energy flows, momentum transfers and the like) whose causal efficacy is not in
dispute and that connect the putatively causal event with the one it supposedly caused. See KIM,
PHYSICALISM, supra note 15, at 47. That is to say, causation is proved by showing an explanatory
mechanism that is comprised of component causes, and components of components, going all the way
down, at least in principle, to the four basic forces of physics acting on the most granular bits of
matter. See ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, Fundamental Interaction, https://www.britannica.com/scien
ce/fundamental-interaction.
The problem with the case for mental causation is that it is based, not on a demonstration of a
mechanism comprised of well-accepted component causes, but rests entirely on a single, unique and ad
hoc causal leap based on a single oft-repeated type of unexplained correlation. By contrast, the
neuroscience inference that behavior is caused by neuronal activity (brain states) rests, not on
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Thus, the apparent mountain of first-person evidence for mental
causation from “virtually every neurologically intact human being” is, on
further consideration, not so imposing after all. It is in its essence nothing
more than billions of replications of the same bit of evidence: namely, the
fallacious inference that nearly every person draws from the same
unexplained correlation—the fallacious inference, countlessly repeated,
that bodily movements are caused by the mental states, such as intentions,
that prefigure them. And the same fatal weakness applies to all of the
“common-sense first-person and third person evidence”183 from every
“intact” person that supposedly shows, in its multiplicity of replications,
that mental causation exists. It is as if (to paraphrase another well-known
line of Wittgenstein) someone were to buy billions of copies of the
morning paper to assure himself that what it says is true.184
If the belief in mental causation is founded on a logical fallacy, one
may wonder why it is so much more readily accepted, and harder for
people to let go of, than other similarly paranormal dubiosities like
psychokinesis, extra-sensory perception and messages that arrive via ouija
boards. Part of the reason is, no doubt, the “absence of surprise”185 and

correlation, but on detailed evidence of intricate mechanisms of component causes (neuronal activity)
which, themselves, can be further broken down into familiar and well-accepted underlying causes,
such as chemical and electrochemical interactions, the physical behavior of ions, and electromotive
forces of attraction and repulsion—causes whose efficacy is not a matter of controversy and that is
confirmed in a huge variety of different contexts across the Universe. For example, electricallycharged subatomic particles can be observed in countless different contexts to produce motion as they
attract and repel, to flow in currents, sometimes carrying larger particles (ions) with them, and to be
organizable by various means into computation-capable arrangements and configurations that are able
to assemble information inputs and organize coherent patterns of electrical outputs, which can serve as
causes of still further events. These kinds of causal interactions are an ordinary, everyday feature of
the universal physical order. We know them, not as a special introspective insight, but as a matter of
general physics.
In sum, even though every causal explanation must, at some level, make the Humean “leap” that
there is such a thing as cause in fact, the leap required by the neuroscience explanation of behavior is
of a completely different order from that made by proponents of mental causation: We must make the
leap of assuming that what appear to be four basic forces of nature are in fact causal. It is true that we
do not know what causes electrical charges to attract and repel, and science must indeed make an
unprovable Humean inference that there is some force (named electromagnetic force) that makes them
do it. But what we do know, as well as we can know anything, is that electrically charged particles and
ions unfailingly do attract and repel wherever they are observed, and that they do so in strict
accordance with physical laws, and that, indeed, if they did not, our entire modern electricity-powered
civilization would fall asunder. The electrical causes on which neuroscience explanations are
fundamentally based are not sui generis or a matter of doubt.
The difference between the fallacious inference of mental causation and the neuroscience
explanation of behavior as caused by brain activity is further discussed infra, Part V.
183. Overclaim, supra note 46, at 401–02.
184. Cf. INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 165, at ¶ 265 (“As if someone were to buy several copies
of the morning paper to assure himself that what it said was true”).
185. Îd. at ¶ 628; see also Valérian Chambon et al., From Action Intentions To Action Effects:
How Does The Sense Of Agency Come About?, FRONTIERS IN NEUROSCIENCE 1, (2014),
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associated sense of agency186 that is experienced when voluntary bodily
movements occur.187 The sense of agency is, however, ambiguous with

https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fnhum.2014.00320/full. (“[We] clearly recognize failures
of agency when we experience actions that do not unfold as expected or fail to produce intended
effects. . . [O]ur sense of “authorship” becomes apparent only when it is falsiﬁed, resulting in a break
of the ﬂow from intentions to action effects that normally characterize experience”). See also D.
O'Connor, The Voluntary Act, 15 MED. SCI. & L. 31, 32 (1975), quoted in Saunders, supra note 13, at
457 n.59 (“Ordinary bodily movement is, in one sense, automatic. This means that one has no
awareness of the series of events that precede it . . . It is not until there is a breakdown or malfunction
that one looks to find causes for abnormal behaviour just as one begins to concern oneself with the
working of motor cars only when something goes wrong”).
186. See Moore, What Is the Sense of Agency, supra note 78, at 2 (describing the sense of
agency as an “elusive experience” that is “phenomenologically thin” and “quite unlike conscious
experience in other modalities, especially vision, where our experiences are phenomenologically
strong and stable”). Not only is “the sense of agency is not an infallible reproduction of objective
reality,” id. at 2, it appears to be highly context-dependent, sensed as stronger in moral contexts as
opposed to non-moral (economic) ones, and stronger with respect to severely negative effects than
with moderately negative effects. Moretto G. et al., Experience of Agency and Sense of Responsibility,
20 CONSCIOUSNESS AND COGNITION 1847 (2011), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/21920776.
In short, the sense of agency may be a very useful tool for calibrating ourselves in social interactions,
but it is not so useful as an accurate measure of the mechanisms of causal interactions.
Indeed, there is apparently some experimental evidence that the “sense of agency” can be
artificially triggered in the absence of agency by direct electrical stimulation of certain areas of the
brain associated with producing bodily movement. Reportedly, these stimulations sometimes can
generate “an irrepressible urge to perform an action, or . . . an anticipation that action is about to
occur,” which was sometimes followed by actual motor activity, sometimes not. See Uri Maoz &
Gideon Yaffe, supra note 31, at 128 (citing Itzhak Fried et al., Functional Organization of Human
Supplementary Motor Cortex Studied by Electrical Stimulation, 11 J. NEUROSCIENCE 3656, 3666
(1991); Michel Desmurget et al., Movement Intention after Parietal Cortex Stimulation in Humans.
324 SCIENCE 811, 813 (2009)). Stimulation of other brain areas could sometimes generate bodily
movements which the patient evidently was unconscious of (or, at any rate, strongly denied. Id. These
experiments suggest that “the sense of agency may not be as strongly coupled with voluntary
movement as humans generally experience them to be, and that—at least under rather abnormal
circumstances—humans may experience agency over phantom actions and carry out actions with no
accompanying sense of agency.” Id. Maoz and Yaffe conclude that it is “far from clear” that “these
experiments show that bodily movements are not guided by conscious mental activity, as required by
the law's voluntary act requirement.” Id. They do, however, seem to confirm that people do not
experience mental causation interaction itself, as evidenced by the fact that the experimental subjects
never seemed to mention it but only mentioned experiencing an “urge” to move or “anticipation” of
movement along with subjective experiences of movement or non-movement.
See also Chambon et al., supra note 185, at 1 (“We rarely have an intense, clear phenomenology
of agency, but we clearly recognize failures of agency when we experience actions that do not unfold
as expected or fail to produce intended effects.... our sense of “authorship” becomes apparent only
when it is falsiﬁed, resulting in a break of the ﬂow from intentions to action effects that normally
characterize experience”).
187. Apparently, the “sense of agency” is due in part to neuronal processes in the angular gyrus
of the parietal lobe that monitor and compare the degree of correspondence between the results of
brain-generated movements and. their computationally predicted results as well as, perhaps, monitor
the “fluency” of computing the choice of actions (the relative “effortlessness” of the choice). See id.
(“[T]he angular gyrus (AG), a parietal brain region which has been shown to compute retrospective
agency by monitoring mismatches between actions and subsequent outcomes . . . may also code for a
prospective sense of agency, by monitoring action selection processes in advance of the action itself,
and independently of action outcomes”). In other words, the sense of agency is computed in the brain
as an inference much like the inference of causation said to be experienced in consciousness. The
researchers do not mention noticing any evidence that detection by the brain of mental causation (as
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respect to the mental-causation question that it is invoked to answer.
It is said that the sense of agency is the “feeling of being in the driving
seat when it comes to our actions.”188 Whenever someone feels a sense of
agency with respect to a given bodily movement, it surely makes sense for
her to infer, at least prima facie, that the movement was generated inside
her person rather than solely by some external force such as, say, a sudden
gust of wind. But it would be a mistake to assume that the having a sense
of agency is the same thing as “sensing mental causation.”189 The
conscious experience of agency has been shown to be “linked to low-level
sensorimotor processes”190 that compute the sense of agency “by matching
predicted and actually experienced consequences of movement.”191 A
“large body of evidence suggests that the sense of agency . . . strongly
depends on the degree of congruence versus incongruence between
predicted and actual sensory outcome . . . .”192 In other words, the sense of
agency appears to be computationally inferred in the brain, not by
monitoring mind/body interactions that constitute mental causation, but

opposed to its detection of purely physiological events associated with the generation of motor signals
and detection of resultant movements) plays any role in the computation of the sense of agency.
188. Moore, What Is the Sense of Agency, supra note 78, at 1; see also Matthis Synofzik et al.,
Beyond the Comparator Model: A Multifactorial Two-Step Account of Agency, 17 CONSCIOUSNESS
AND COGNITION 219 (2006) (“[It is] the registration that we are the initiators of our own actions”).
189. A distinction Professor Morse glided over. See Scientific Challenges, supra note 46, at
847.
190. Moore, What Is the Sense of Agency, supra note 78, at 1.
191. Chambon et al., supra note 185, at 1. According to Chambon et al., using the “influential”
comparator account,” “agency is computed by matching predicted and actually experienced
consequences of movement.” Thus, the comparator model allows for two specific predictions. First,
sense of agency should be strong when there is a close match between the predicted and the actual
sensory consequences of an action, and should be reduced when predicted and experienced
consequences do not match. Second, sense of agency necessarily occurs late, i.e., after an action has
been performed, and sensory evidence about the consequences of action becomes available.” Id.
Chambon et al., also have found evidence of a brain mechanism that can compute the sense of agency
prospectively, but it too has nothing to do with detecting mental causation per se. Rather, it works by
monitoring the relative “fluency” of computing the choice of which action to perform (the relative
“effortlessness” of the choice). Id. at 6–8.
There is some debate over the adequacy of the comparator model to fully explain the feelings and
judgments of agency, but no one suggests that the sense of agency is anything but a computed
inference or is based on direct detection of mental causation. See also Glenn Carruthers, The Case for
the Comparator Model as an Explanation of the Sense of Agency and Its Breakdowns, 21
CONSCIOUSNESS & COGNITION 30 (2010); Glenn Carruthers, A Comparison of Fortunes: The
Comparator and Multifactorial Weighting Models of the Sense of Agency, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 9TH
CONF. OF THE AUSTRALIAN SOC'Y FOR COGNITIVE SCIENCE (2010); Nicole David et al., The “Sense of
Agency” and Its Underlying Cognitive and Neural Mechanisms, 17 CONSCIOUSNESS & COGNITION
523 (2008); Synofzik et al., supra note 188, at 3.
192. David et al., supra note 191, at 524. The fact that the brain computes the sense of agency
merely as an inference and not be by monitoring mental-cause interactions directly is not, of course,
proof that mental causation does not exist. But it does show that the sense of agency can hardly be
treated as relevant evidence for mental causation.
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rather on the basis of before-and-after correlations between the pre-motor
neuronal preparations and subsequently perceived bodily movements. So
even if the sense of agency can be fairly taken to imply that the immediate
cause of a bodily movement was something within the person in question,
it is a pure interpretational flourish, unsupported by any factual basis, to
say that the causal “something” was the person’s mental states rather than
her brain activity. Accordingly, the sense of agency adds no experiential
evidence of mental causation that could bolster the logically fallacious
inference based on bare correlation that we already know about.
Another reason why belief in mental causation may be so hard to let
go of is that the specific content of intentions and reasons seems to
correlate so closely with the bodily movements that follow or co-occur
with them. If a person consciously intends to raise her right hand, it is
always the right hand that goes up, never the left.193 While this reliable
correlation is impressive, it becomes less impressive when one considers
that the brain states (neuronal activity) needed to produce bodily
movements would have exactly the same reliable correlation with the
movements they produce. That is, a pattern of neuronal activity that raises
the right arm today would always also raise the right arm tomorrow.194 As

193. Hedda Hassel Mørch has made a well-reasoned argument that this coincidence supports
an evolutionary argument for mental causation (or, as she calls it, “phenomenal powers”) by invoking
the methodology of inference to best explanation. See Mørch, The Evolutionary Argument, supra note
9. Her analysis is, however, in terms of the correlation between actions and the qualia of pain and
pleasure sensations, not in terms of the correlation with the kinds of mental states (intentions, reasons,
etc.) most relevant to criminal law. She makes a strong argument that the qualitative experience of
“pain,” in particular, makes it highly improbable that it would have evolved to be “what it is like”
unless the feeling of pain had the power to prompt action.
In the end, however, I disagree with her conclusion that qualia can be causally effective. The way
that things look, smell, feel, taste and sound may greatly enrich our conscious experience and therefore
seem of great subjective importance, but as far as anyone knows, the exact qualities of these
experiences—what they are “like”—is just as arbitrary as the coloration of isotherms on a newspaper
weather map. Even though the feeling of pain is especially poignant, the more obvious physical
explanation for its putative causal power is that, whenever we experience pain, a lot of other neuronal
activity is going on (some of which we experience as “emotion”) as part of the body’s procedures to
prepare itself to deal with a possible crisis. There is no reason to think that any motor neuron activity
that we believe to be produced by the feeling of pain is, in fact, produced by the neuronal activity that
gave rise to the pain qualia in the first place (and this would be the preferred interpretation—absent
evidence to the contrary—for anyone with physicalist leanings).
194. I do not mean to question “multiple realization” here. That is, I am not saying that a given
bodily movement can only be produced by a single specific sequence of neuronal activity and no other.
What I am saying, though, is that a given sequence of movement-producing neuronal activity can only
produce one specific kind of movement—with which it (and its supervenient mental state) is
correlated. It could not cause the right arm to rise on one occasion and the left arm to rise on the next. I
cannot say there is a broad evidentiary base of experimental results confirming the close correlation
that logically must exist (for a physicalist) between mental states and particular neuronal activity
across a broad spectrum of possible mental states, but there is evidence that such a correlation exists
and none, to my knowledge, that disconfirms it. For example, studies using functional MRI have
already evidence of detectable differences between the brain-states associated with the legally-relevant
mental states of “knowledge” and “recklessness,” respectively. See Iris Vilaris et al., Predicting the
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a result, it would seem fair to conclude that there is a three-way correlation
between (1) putatively causal mental states, such as intentions, (2) the cooccurring brain activity needed to produce the motor signals to the body,
and (3) the bodily movements that occur.
Given such a three-way correlation among mental states, neuronal
activity and movements, we are now left with the question of what causes
what? In particular, are bodily movements caused by the mental states that
are highly correlated with them or are they caused by the (also) highly
correlated neuronal activity? The simple answer would seem to be that it is
the neuronal activity alone that does the real causal work: It is the neuronal
activity that causes the correlated bodily movement and also gives rise to
or “enables”195 the correlated mental states (which are, accordingly,
dependent on it196 ). More elaborately, a commitment to the truth of
physicalism and, in particular, of “causal closure”197 would prevent
choosing the mental correlate in preference to the physical (neuronal)
correlate as the one that does the causal work—on the ground that every
event that has a cause must have a sufficient physical cause. Then under an
analysis sometimes known as the “exclusion principle,” the mental cause
must be “excluded” to avoid a double-counting of causes.198 Therefore, if
one wants to claim the mantle of physicalism, the question of causation
within the three-way correlation has to be resolved in favor of neuronal
causation; both the attendant mental states and the bodily movements
would thus be dependent on the physical. There appears to be no way to

Knowledge/Recklessness Distinction in the Human Brain (2017), www.pnas.org/cgi/doi/10.1073/pnas.
1619385114.
195. See Common Sense, supra note 46, at 47 (“[T]he brain enables the mind”).
196. This idea that mental states are dependent on underlying neuronal activity for both their
existence and their content is just another way of saying that the mind cannot directly apprehend and
perceive facts about the outer world without the help of the sensory organs and their neuronal
connections to the brain, and that it cannot float about freely above its physical base and autonomously
generate trains of thought, intentions or other content on its own. If that is so (and a commitment to
physicalism would seem to require it), then mental states can only have the content that is supplied to
them by the biomechanical functioning of the brain, sense organs and nervous system. And if that is
the case, it is difficult to see how the presence of particular mental states, such as intentions, could
have any independent moral significance in attributions of responsibility. See PHYSICALISM DILEMMA,
supra note 149.
197. See KIM, PHYSICALISM, supra note 15, at 36–45. “Causal closure” says that physical
events must have sufficient physical causes (if they have any causes at all). The causal closure
principle is further discussed in greater detail supra note 150.
198. According to the exclusion principle, it is inconsistent to say that an event has both a
sufficient physical cause and also a necessary mental cause, and it is double counting to say that an
event has both a sufficient physical cause and, in addition, a mental cause where the mental cause
depends on the physical cause for its existence and content (viz. is supervenient on it). Events may, of
course, have multiple sufficient causes in cases of genuine overdetermination, but it is not a case of
genuine overdetermination when one of the multiple causes is dependent on the other. The exclusion
principle is further discussed in greater detail in PHYSICALISM DILEMMA, supra note 149.
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insist instead on the causal efficacy of mental states other than by either
rejecting causal closure and the exclusion principle (which means
disavowing physicalism) or by asserting that mental states can somehow
float free of their underlying neuronal activity (also inconsistent with
physicalism). Either of these moves would allow one to conclude that
mental causation exists, but both of them would require a disavowal of
physicalism.
In sum, there is no reason to doubt the “subjective experience of first
person agency” that “virtually every neurologically intact human being
takes for granted,” but there is also no reason to interpret that experience
as evidence of mental causation rather than purely neuronal causation. The
foreknowledge one has that a bodily movement will occur (on which
subjective sense of agency is neuronally based199) clearly supports an
inference that the movement was caused by factors within oneself. But it
would be pure conjecture to treat the sense of agency as amounting to a
specification that those internal factors are mental as opposed to purely
physiological.
Before closing, it should be stressed none of this is meant to say that
the “experience” of mental causation is an illusion. The point is, rather,
that there is no such thing as an “experience” of mental causation at all.
What there is, instead, is an inference of mental causation that people draw
based on a simple correlation between other experiences that they have
(viz. their conscious intentions and their subsequent bodily movements).
And is a fallacious inference at that. As a result, no matter how many
times the intentions/actions correlation is observed and noted, it can no
more show that mental states cause bodily movements than a stack of
calendars can show that Tuesdays cause Wednesdays. Even less does the
correlation provide a basis for asserting that mental causation is entitled to
a presumption of truth. The neuroskeptic’s case for mental causation is
seriously overclaimed.200
B. The Detection Argument for Mental-State Causal Efficacy
In addition to the correlation evidence that is commonly (and
fallaciously) cited as proof of mental causation, there is also what might be
called a “detection” argument. The idea of the detection argument is this:
It must be true that mental states can cause events to occur in the physical
domain because, if they could not, there would be no plausible explanation
for certain observed behavioral facts, such as the fact that people say they

199.
200.

See supra note 191.
Cf. Overclaim, supra note 46, at 397–412; Neurolaw, supra note 46, at 7, 31.
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have mental states, talk about them and even write articles and books
about them. There would be nothing to systematically cause the physical
brain to produce these expressive behaviors (lips moving, fingers typing,
etc.) if it could not detect the existence of mental states and be physically
affected by them.
It is inferable from observed behavior not only that physical brains can
detect the existence of mental states (i.e., consciousness) but also that they
can detect the fact that mental states differ from one another in qualitative
content, i.e., that they differ in what they are about201 and in what it “is
like” to have them.202 This ability of the brain to detect that mental states
are diverse can be reliably inferred from the observed behavioral fact that
people describe their mental experiences as differing from one another,
being apt to say, for example, that the experience of a pinprick does not
feel the same as a spoonful of crème brulêe. If physical brains were not
able to detect and be physically affected by the diverseness of mental
states, the brain would have no cause to produce the observable expressive
behavior of talking and writing about the differences. Accordingly, from
the fact that physical brains do cause people to talk and write about both
the existence of mental states and the diversity among them, one can
conclude that both their existence and their diverseness are able to produce
perturbations in the electrical patterns that process information in the
brain.203 At least to this extent, mental states appear to be causally
efficacious in the physical domain.
The detection argument seems sound in its limited application
(showing that brains can be affected by the existence and diverseness of
mental states), but it would go beyond the evidence to say that the
detection argument establishes that behavior can be caused or influenced
by intentions and reasons, i.e., that persons are “agents.” And as long as
“no responsibility is possible if people are not agents,”204 then the limited

201. For example, if you are consciously aware that you’re seeing a duck, then you have a
mental state about seeing a duck. If you’re consciously aware that you are sipping pinot noir, you have
a mental state about sipping pinot noir. If you are consciously aware that you intend to rob a
supermarket, you have a mental state about intending to rob a supermarket. The “qualitative content”
of such mental states include, as part of the overall mental state, a conscious awareness of the sight of
a duck, of wine gliding across the tongue or of desiring to rob a supermarket, as the case may be. The
idea of the qualitative content of mental states includes what are sometimes referred to as “qualia” and
propositional attitudes.
202. Cf. Thomas Nagel, What is it Like to Be a Bat? in MORTAL QUESTIONS (1979).
203. Actually, it might also be possible that the behaviors concerning mental states described in
this section might occur even if mental states did not exist at all as long as people have the illusion of
mental states (whatever that might mean). I am setting that possibility aside, however, since people
who think mental states are illusions surely do not believe in mental causation, and my aim is to show
that the belief in mental causation, for those who have such a belief, is ungrounded.
204. Inevitable Mind, supra note 3, at 46; Common Sense, supra note 46, at 67; see also supra
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mental causation established by the detection argument is not enough to
justify blame and punishment.
The reason that the detection argument does not suffice to provide
evidence of “agency” is this: In order for the brain to produce behavior
reflecting intentions and reasons, the brain would have to be able to detect
what those intentions and reasons are—meaning that mental states such as
intentions and reasons would have to able to physically modify the brain
or, at least, its patterns of electrical activity, according to their qualitative
content. However, the only behavioral evidence that mental-state content
(such as intentions and reasons) could physically modify the brain or the
patterns of electrical activity in it is the introspectively observed fact that
there is a correlation between intentions and reasons and subsequent
actions. This correlation alone cannot, however, support a valid inference
that the brain can detect the content of mental states because, in the
absence of any suggestion of an explanatory mechanism, such an inference
would be, once again, pure post hoc ergo propter hoc.
Besides, there is a perfectly good physical explanation for the
observed correlations between mental-state content and subsequent
actions, namely: Because mental states depend for their content on brain
states,205 any information that the brain could gain by detecting mentalstate content would simply duplicate informational content that the brain
already has. For example, if a motorist is prompted to stop when she
approaches a red light, the pivotal causative trigger leading her to push the
brake need not be the conscious mental experience of seeing redness. She
could just as well be triggered to stop by the physical fact that the
radiation entering her eyes from the traffic signal has a wavelength of
roughly 680 nanometers rather than 520 nanometers (green). The neuronal
detection of the radiation’s wavelength is perfectly adequate to serve as
the dispositive factor in the computational production of the resulting
behavior, viz. brake-pushing rather than gas-goosing. There is no need to
suppose that the brain would have need to refer to the content of any cooccurring mental states which, in any event, are epistemically dependent
on the neuronal detection of the light’s wavelength. In short, there is no
reason why the brain cannot plausibly produce behavior that is highly
correlated with the qualitative content of mental states using the very same
information that the mental-states’ content itself is based on—information
that the physical brain collected and assembled in the first place.
To take another example, the more obvious reason why a person reacts
differently to the soft fur of a kitten than to a hammer blow on the thumb

Part II.A and notes 98–99.
205. See supra note 196.
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is not that the two events produce different mental-state content in
consciousness, which is then detected by the brain. The more obvious
reason is an ordinary physical reason, namely, that sensory data coming in
from the peripheral touch receptors in the hand activate different
populations of neurons in the case of the kitten than in the case of the
hammer. The activation of those different populations of neurons gives
rise to the different mental-state content that is experienced in the two
cases as well as producing the different sets of behavioral reactions that
follow.
One last point: If the brain manifestly can detect that mental states
differ from one another in qualitative content (mental-state diversity), does
it not follow that it must also be able to detect what that qualitative content
is—what the various different mental states are like and what they are
about? The answer is not necessarily. The brain could, for instance, be in
much the same position as an archeologist who discovers a text written in
an unknown ancient language: While the archeologist can easily detect
that the text contains many different words, she cannot detect what the
various words mean—their content. To be sure, it seems plausible to
assume that the brain’s computational machinery is able to ascribe
qualitative content to different mental states by associating them in
memory with the various sensory perceptions, proprioceptions, and states
of neuronal activity that co-occurred with them. And such ascribed
contents of remembered mental states should align closely with the mental
states’ actual contents.206 It is even plausible that memories of content
previously ascribed to mental states experienced in the past could become
factors in the brain’s computational decisions when producing behavior
later on. But even if all this does indeed occur, it still would not be a true
case of mental-state content causing effects in the physical domain. It
would still be the brain’s physical processes alone that are doing all the
causal work.207

206. Still assuming, as before, that mental states depend on brain states for their content. See
supra note 196.
207. The argument in this (and the preceding two) paragraphs owes a great debt to Jaegwon
Kim, who has presented similar ideas in somewhat different terms. See KIM, PHYSICALISM, supra note
15, at 170–73. According to Professor Kim, if I understand him correctly, the brain can easily detect
that red lights and green lights are different even if it has no information at all as to what it is “like” to
see red or green. The reason is that different light wavelengths cause different raw data to be sent from
the eyes. While it often occurs that behavior is modulated by detected differences in what it is “like” to
experience differing non-reducible mental events, such as color differences, it does not appear that
there are instances in which behavior is modulated by the intrinsic nature of what it is “like” to see a
given color (or to experience other “qualia”). See generally id. But cf. Mørch, supra note 9 (for a
strong argument using as counter-examples the qualia of pain and pleasure).
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In sum, while the detection argument for mental causation may show
that the existence and diverseness of mental states have effects in the
physical domain, the evidence does not support a valid inference that the
qualitative content of mental states (intentions, reasons, etc.) can alter the
patterns of electrical activity that process information in the brain. It does
not, in other words, support a conclusion that such mental-state content
can ever in se make a difference in the physical domain—as is said to be
required as a prerequisite for agency and responsibility.208 To infer that the
content of mental states can make a physical difference is to make an
inference based on bare correlation, an inference that would be premised
on the logical fallacy of post hoc ergo propter hoc.
V. INFERENCE TO THE BEST EXPLANATION
Thanks to the findings of neuroscience in recent decades, we now
have two different causal explanations of human behavior: First, there is
the traditional, folk psychology view that the things we do are caused, at
least in part, by mental states such as intentions and reasons. Second, there
is the neuroscience alternative, viz. that human behavior is determined
solely by ordinary physical causes acting upon the biomechanical
physiology of the brain. The two causal explanations have very different
implications for justice. The older, folk psychology explanation supports
the widely shared position that persons who do wrong “deserve” to suffer
because they are agents and therefore are morally responsible for their
actions. The neuroscience alternative does not support this idea of “just
deserts.” Assuming that criminal justice practices are defensible only if
their underlying factual premises are true, the crucial question is: Which of
these two rival explanations of human behavior comes nearest to the truth?
They cannot both be correct. How do we decide between them?
Abductive reasoning, or “inference to the best explanation,” is a
reasoning methodology that is commonly used to decide among competing
inferences that can be drawn from a given set of observations and data.209
The idea is to determine which of the competing inferences best explains
the relevant evidence by comparing each one “with its rivals in point of
explanatory power.”210 The inference that best explains the totality of the

208. See Inevitable Mind, supra note 3, at 46; Common Sense, supra note 46, at 67; supra Part
II.A and notes 98–99.
209. See Gilbert Harmon, The Inference to the Best Explanation, 74 PHIL REV. 88–99 (1965).
See also KIM, PHYSICALISM, supra note 15, at 126–30. For an excellent summary of the abductive
reasoning process as applied to fact-finding in law, see Ronald J. Allen & Michael S. Pardo, Relative
Plausibility and Its Critics 12–34 (2018), http://ssrn.com/abstract=3179601. See generally Igor
Douven, Abduction, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (2017).
210. KIM, PHYSICALISM, supra note 15, at 129.
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relevant evidence and data is inferred to be the one that comes closest to
the truth.211 It is a reasoning methodology that people use continually and
intuitively, not just in science and law but in everyday life, to make sense
of incomplete information or data. To take a simple example, suppose
someone looks out her window and sees passersby carrying rolled up
umbrellas. Two possible inferences occur to her. The first is that the day’s
weather forecast includes a prediction of rain. The second is that it is
“Take Your Umbrella to Work Day.” While either of these inferences
could logically explain the observations and data at hand, she reflects that,
though it often rains, she cannot recall hearing of a “Take Your Umbrella
to Work Day.” Besides, it is cloudy. She quickly decides which of the
possible inferences provides the best explanation and prepares herself for
rain.
It is not hard to see why, before the advent of modern neuroscience
research, the inference of mental causation was, despite its frothy factual
basis, accepted as the best explanation for human behavior. After all, what
else was there?212 During the long pre-history of neural research, when
even the best informed scientists had no idea how brains worked or
neuronal activity could produce human behavior, the mental causation
hypothesis must have seemed obvious—as indeed, to many people, it still
does today.213 More to the point, when lawyers and judges were working
to structure the criminal law’s foundational assumptions several centuries

211. “[O]ne infers, from the premise that a given hypothesis would provide a “better”
explanation for the evidence than would any other hypotheses, to the conclusion that the given
hypothesis is true.” Harmon, supra note 209, at 89.
Needless to say, the explanation that is to be considered “best” is the one that best accounts for
the available evidence and data and not, for example, the one that best supports a particular policy
preference. Also, it should be specified that, for present purposes, we are looking for the best causal
explanation and, as noted earlier, not all explanations are “causal” explanations. See supra note 15. For
some purposes, a non-causal explanation may be good enough or, even, preferable--for example, one
might explain to a child that birds build nests because they need a place to raise their young rather than
explain the actual causes (season-induced hormones, etc.). See id. Similarly, explaining our own and
others’ behavior in terms of mental states may, as Quine said, be useful as “irreducibly mental ways of
grouping physical states and events.” QUINE, supra note 15, at 72. Indeed, the common practice of
explaining persons’ actions by reference to accompanying mental states would be incontestably
convenient whether or not mental states have a causal role. The reason is that everyone learns to
“read” others’ presumed mental states by associating them with behavioral clues, projecting from what
they know of their own mental states. Having learned these associations, it then seems natural to
explain and understand our own and others’ behavior by reference to mental-state surrogates or
metonyms instead of naming the underlying brain states. Such metonymic or surrogate explanations do
not, however, mean that the mental states actually cause the behavior, at least not in the sense that
would be required if mental causation is deemed to be an indispensable pre-condition for holding
people morally responsible and deserving of punishment. It is not, in other words, the best causal
explanation.
212. There were, to be sure, explanations that were even more far-fetched. See supra note 129.
213. See supra note 173.
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ago, mental causation was not only the best available explanation of
human behavior, it was the only game in town. As such, it prevailed by
default.
[However,] part of what lends credibility to the talk of inference to
the best explanation . . . is the fact that putting competing theories to
test on the basis of how well they explain the data is an ongoing, inprinciple never-ending, affair. When further data are in, the
rankings of the theories in terms of their explanatory power may
very well change.214
In other words, one cannot simply say that, just because mental causation
was the best explanation for human behavior 300 years ago, it still remains
the best explanation today. It cannot be said that the question has been
settled once and for all.
So how do the two alternative accounts of human behavior compare
today in their ability to explain the totality of the relevant evidence and
data? The neuroscience view, that behavior is the result of mundane
physical forces channeled in ordinary physiological processes, is
(unsurprisingly) consistent with and supported by the wealth of
physiological evidence and data that decades of neuroscience research
have produced. Based on that evidence and data, neuroscientists are able
to provide sophisticated descriptions of the electrochemical activity in the
brain and how it can cause the bodily movements that add up to human
behavior. In literally millions of experiments over the past several
decades,215 neuroscientists have accumulated a deep, complex and
internally consistent web of evidence and data showing that bodily
movements, not just of people but of every motile creature on earth, have
ordinary physical causes: In every known motile creature, neuronallyembodied information from the sense organs travels to the brain where it
is processed along with previously registered information (memories) to
create representations of potential behavioral options which are then
computationally compared, leading to the generation of motor signals to
the muscles to produce behavior that is calibrated to respond to the current
outside situation in light of the individual’s internal needs and memories
of what worked in the past.216
In contrast to the broad and robust factual basis for the neuronalcausation thesis, the mental-causation hypothesis provides no description

214. KIM, PHYSICALISM, supra note 15, at 130.
215. See supra note 4.
216. See PASSINGHAM, supra note 4, at 67–70 (discussing how options are comparatively
valued in the prefrontal cortex based on inputs from the various sensory perception area (for sight,
sound, touch, etc.). See generally SAPOLSKY, supra note 6, at 21–77.
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whatever of how incorporeal thoughts, flashing through the mind, could
cause physical bodies to move. And this is not to mention the difficulty of
fitting the mental-causation hypothesis in with the mass of hard evidence
produced by neuroscience.
Perhaps in recognition of this latter difficulty, there is a tendency
among neuroskeptics either to ignore the implications of the neuroscience
(especially in legal discussions) or to pre-emptively dismiss the science on
the ground that it fails to answer certain non-germane questions, such as
how neuronal activity brings about mental states or how mental states
produce actions.217 Professor Morse writes, for example, that it is
“neuroarrogance” to suggest we should consider making big changes in
punishment practices based on neuroscience “[g]iven how little we know
about the brain-mind and brain-mind-action connections.”218 Professor
Morse is, of course, quite correct in saying that today’s neuroscience does
not does not explain the connection between the brain, the mind and
actions—the “brain-mind-action” connection. His mistake is to think it
matters.219
As far as neuroscience’s causal explanation of behavior is concerned,
the brain-mind-action connection that Professor Morse finds so vital is a
total irrelevancy. The neuroscience explanation is entirely physiological,
and the mind as such has no evident role to be explained. On the contrary,
for neuroscience the only real question about behavior is the “brain-body”
question: how the brain produces movement. And in answer to that
question, neuroscience has data in abundance. It supports an explanation
that is based entirely on ordinary physical forces and well-understood
biochemical and electrical causes. It is an explanation that has no place for
mental causation as part of the explanatory structure.

217. Morse, LawSci, supra note 37, at 23–24; Morse, Common Sense, supra note 46, at 67;
Morse, Exuberance, supra note 46, at 859. Dennis Patterson, Neuromania: A Review of Peter A. Alces,
The Moral Conflict of Law and Neuroscience 5 J. L. BIOSCI. 3 (2018) (book review) (“[N]euroscience
simply has not progressed to the point where it can even tell us how the brain enables the mind”); The
findings of neuroscience are also dismissed on the ground that they are irrelevant to normative
questions because they can only show causes and “causes are not excuses.” See supra note Part II.D.
218. See Morse, Overclaim, supra note 46, at 397–412 (emphasis added); see also Morse,
Neurolaw, supra note 46, at 7, 31; Morse, Overclaim Redux, supra note 46.
219. Notably, perhaps, it does not seem to matter to the mind-centric friends of mentalcausation that their alternative likewise provides no explanation the brain-mind and brain-mind-action
connections, much less a “better” explanation. As a criterion of “arrogance,” the ability to account for
these connections seems to receive decidedly selective application.
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As long as there is no evidence that mental states and consciousness
play a causal role in determining what people do (and there is not),
neuroscience has no need to explain them or take them into account in
explaining the causes of human behavior. To be sure, the creation and
ontological nature of conscious mental states may be of enormous
philosophical interest, but as a causal explanation of behavior, the
neuroscience explanation is not diminished in the slightest by the fact that
mental states remain “conceptual and scientific mysteries.”220
This is not to say, of course, that the neuroscience explanation of
behavior has been fully fleshed out or there is no more to know about it.221
But despite the existence of many areas for further research, the
neuroscience evidence we already have leaves no genuine question that
mechanical, computational processes alone are capable of generating
bodily movements—as they do throughout the animal kingdom. From
studies of animals having brains far less evolved than ours (and, almost
certainly, no minds), we know with veritable certainty that sophisticated
behavioral repertoires can be managed by neuronal activity alone, with no
plausible possibility of control by mental states. Even insects are known to
rescue injured comrades and nurse them back to health.222 And the world
is packed full of mindless creatures that are fully able to set themselves
into motion and do all they need do to survive and thrive under the
direction of mechanical computational processes that are dynamically
responsive to their situations and neuronally-embodied behavioral
dispositions. Even though there are still some gaps in the neuroscience
story, there are none that “mental causation” (about which we know
nothing at all) could helpfully fill.
To summarize, in a world of less-than-perfect information, the issue is
not whether an explanation is perfectly complete or “conclusive.” The
issue is, rather, which of the inferences from the facts we know provides
the best explanation for the totality of relevant evidence and data.223 On
this score there is really no contest between mental-causation explanation
of behavior and the neuroscience explanation. The biomechanical
description provided by neuroscience is both robust and supported in

220. Morse, Inevitable Mind, supra note 3, at 33.
221. See Morse, LawScI, supra note 37, at 24 (“[W]e still do not have sophisticated causal
knowledge of how the brain enables the mind and action generally”). See also supra note 34.
222. Erik T. Frank et al., Wound Treatment And Selective Help In A Termite-Hunting Ant,
PROCEEDINGS OF THE ROYAL SOCIETY B. (Feb. 14, 2018), http://rspb.royalsocietypublishing.org/cont
ent/285/1872/20172457.
223. See KIM, PHYSICALISM, supra note 15, at 129 (“[If the] aim is to reach a conclusion that
we should believe as true, or be prepared to use as a guide for action, [we] must respect the principle
of total evidence, and in the present case this means that the data, or evidence, to be explained must be
all the data relevant to the issue at hand”).
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detail by an intricate and internally coherent web of experimental evidence
and data. The mental-causation hypothesis, by contrast, merely posits a
blunt causal relationship between two widely disparate kinds of events,
mental and physical, suggesting nothing in the way of a mechanism by
which that causal relationship could be effectuated.224
Even more importantly, the mental-causation hypothesis does not deal
with or even try to integrate the parallel track of behavior causation that
neuroscience has revealed. Inferring mental causation from the fact that
actions follow intentions is not merely fallacious in itself but it provides
no explanation whatever of the extant evidence and data. It neither
explains them away as false (a dubious possibility) nor does it suggest
how mental states could override the physical brain’s behavioral
determinations and thus secure a distinctive causal role that is consistent
with the evidence and data.
If it is the “best” explanation that we are looking for, the one that best
fits together all of the relevant evidence and data, the mental-causation
hypothesis, rooted in logical fallacy, is no longer the one. The best
explanation is that neuronal activity, not intentions, reasons and other
mental states, are the actual causes of what people do.225
VI. SOME IMPLICATIONS FOR JUSTICE
The accumulating wealth of findings from neuroscience research
makes it increasingly clear that current criminal justice practices are
morally predicated on a factual premise that is almost certainly false,
namely, that wrongful conduct is caused by intentions, reasons and other
mental states. From this false premise has followed the faulty moral
certitude that those who do wrong “deserve” to endure suffering and
hardship at the hands of the state. In view of the evidence we now have,

224. In demanding a complete explanation and “conclusive” proof, see supra text
accompanying notes 105–112, the neuroskeptic who rejects the “best explanation” of human behavior
is like the person who does not “completely” understand cars and therefore feels entitled to reject
ordinary physical explanations. Though he knows about pistons, spark plugs, gasoline and so on, there
is a lot he does not know, so he says: “Until someone shows me conclusive proof of the ‘motor’
explanation of automobile movements, I’m entitled to believe that the car moves because I hold my
hands on the steering wheel and my foot on the pedal (post hoc ergo propter hoc).” Indeed, in the
absence of a “conclusive” explanation, I suppose that one is “entitled” chose any explanation one
pleases—but that is not the question. The question is whether one is entitled to use that explanation as
a part of a pretext for inflicting hardship and deprivation on millions of others.
225. Note that to say that mental states like intentions and reasons are not effective causes of
human behavior does not by any means equate to saying they do not exist at all. I see no basis in the
evidence of neuroscience for saying that they do not. I am quite sure that they do exist, but (like most
things) they may not be what we think they are. The “thing in itself” of intentions, reasons and
reasoning does not necessarily mirror the phenomena of them in consciousness.
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however, the “best” explanation of human behavior—the one that best
accounts for the totality of the evidence—is the brain-based biomechanical
explanation that is provided by neuroscience. The older but still dominant
mental-causation hypothesis, premised on logical fallacy, is no longer
credible (for those who demand evidence) and in any case is no longer
necessary to a complete factual explanation of why people do what they
do. Based on today’s best explanation of human behavior, there is good
reason to believe that current punishment practices and our bloated
criminal justice system226 can no longer be morally justified.
The treatment of offenders in our criminal justice system
systematically deprives millions of Americans of practically everything
makes life worth living, and it is sharply biased racially to boot. It is
designed to be callous and indifferent to the distress and misery of the
people subjected to it, and it is. Given the immense human cost of this
system, not just to those actually incarcerated but also to their families and
their communities, the intellectual bankruptcy of its justificatory
underpinnings should be a matter of serious concern.227 To the extent that
the justification for current punishment practices depends on the belief that
offenders “deserve” what they get because of their own bad intentions, the
cloud cast by neuroscience on the mental causation hypothesis
unavoidably prompts the question: What are the implications for justice of
recent neuroscience findings that show it is extremely unlikely, based on
the totality of evidence, that wrongful conduct is in fact caused by
intentions, reasons or other mental states?
One major possibility is, of course, that recent neuroscience findings
will turn out to have no impact on criminal justice practices or the
treatment of offenders. An appetite for retribution runs strong in human
psychology, and people become indignant, even angry, when someone
suggests that offenders should not be punished for their crimes.228 The

226. The United States has the highest prisoner population in the world and the highest number
per capita (with stark racial disparities in rates of incarceration). See Countries With the Largest
Number of Prisoners Per 100,000 of the National Population, as of July 2017, STATISTA,
https://www.statista.com/statistics/262962/countries-with-the-most-prisoners-per-100-000inhabitants/; Institute for Criminal Policy Research, World Prison Brief, http://www.prisonstudies.org/
highest-to-lowest/prison_population_rate; John A. Humbach, Is America Becoming a Nation of ExCons? 12 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 605 (2015).
227. See generally Andrew M. Koppelman, American Evil: A Response to Kleinfeld on
Punishment, 50 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 179 (2018); Christopher Wildeman et al., Conditions of Confinement in
American Prisons and Jails, ANNUAL REV. L. & SOC. SCI. (2018), https://doi.org/10.1146/annurevlawsocsci-101317-031025).
228. See Isaac Wiegman, The Evolution of Retribution: Intuitions Undermined, 98 PACIFIC
PHIL Q. 193 (2017); Katherine Harmon, Does Revenge Serve an Evolutionary Purpose? SCIENTIFIC
AM. (May 4, 2011) (“Magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) scans have revealed that thinking about
revenge activates the reward center—where the feel-good neurotransmitter dopamine is lodged—
in much the same way that sweet foods or even drugs can”), https://www.scientificamerican.com/articl
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suffering of others can be a soothing consolation for suffering of one’s
own.229 Even when science provides facts that show we are better off if we
sublimate vestigial yearnings,230 people’s understanding of their world “is
not just a matter of arguments” but what they “want to be true.”231 The
findings of science can simply be ignored. “Human kind,” wrote T.S.
Eliot, “cannot bear very much reality.”232
Another possibility is that the findings will be accepted but the law
could be adapted in order to continue the old ways. One conceptually easy
adaptation would be simply to revert to the idea that requital alone is a
sufficient basis for deserving punishment.233 Alternatively, it would be a
simple matter to modify the legal elements of “intention” and “volition” so
they do not refer to mental states but instead to brain states—specifically,
to those brain states that are evidenced by behavior manifestations that the
law already uses to infer intentions and other mental states.234 The
Supreme Court has shown itself perfectly willing to approve replacing a
legal mens rea requirement with a behavioral surrogate as long as the
defendant manifests behavior that mimics the prescribed mens rea.235 In
any case, it is the moral logic of democracy that, in general, the people’s
desires must be accorded great deference because there is no earthly

e/revenge-evolution/. See also my discussion of this topic in John A., Humbach, The Humane
Principle and the Biology of Blame (Evolutionary Origins of the Imperative to Inflict), in
PROCEEDINGS OF 3RD ANNUAL GLOBAL CONFERENCE ON PERSPECTIVES ON EVIL AND HUMAN
WICKEDNESS (2003), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1524257.
229. Or maybe it is just that “we love this kind of thing” and have a great yearning to hurt
someone, and they pounce on the opportunity when it arises.” Koppelman, supra note 301, at 187–88.
230. As, for example, nutritional science supports efforts to resist the now counter-adapative
predilection for dietary sugars and fats.
231. Larissa MacFarquhar, Mind Expander, THE NEW YORKER (Apr. 2, 2018) (describing
thought of Scotland-based philosopher Andy Clark) (“[T]he way you understand yourself and your
relation to the world is not just a matter of arguments: your life's experiences construct what you
expect and want to be true”); see also Jane Esberg and Jonathan Mummolo, Explaining
Misperceptions of Crime, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3208303 (exploring
reasons for the disconnect between public beliefs about crime and the actual facts of the matter
concerning the prevalence of criminality).
232. T.S. Eliot, Burnt Norton, in FOUR QUARTETS (1943).
233. As noted earlier, studies have shown that, as an abstract matter, people say they think
determinism is not consistent with holding offenders responsible but, when presented with concrete
cases of bad behavior, they tend to attribute responsibility even for actions caused by neurological
disorders. See Nichols, supra note 77, at 1402.
234. Already, intentions and the like are inferred from behavior, since mental states cannot be
known directly. See, e.g., People v. Conley, 543 N.E.2d 138 (Ill. App. 1989). It has been argued that
this is close to what courts have always implicitly done anyway. See Katrina L. Sifferd, supra note 9,
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2512325. (“When a judge or jury is looking for
the mental state that is causally linked to criminal harm, they are also implicitly looking for whatever
physical state realizes the content of that mental state.”).
235. Egelhoff v. Montana, 518 U.S.37 (1996) (premeditation requirement satisfied if a
defendant too drunk to premeditate acted like he premeditated).
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authority with legitimate power to overrule them. If the democratic “will”
demands placatory torture236 in the name of justice, the demand may be its
own justification.
Let us assume, however, that the neuroscience facts turn out to matter,
at least in the longer run, and that an effort is made to align criminal
justice policy with moral justifications that are predicated on the best
explanations of the evidence and data. Let us assume that, when the
mental causation hypothesis is factually discredited, the idea that people
“deserve” to suffer will lose favor and neminem laede237 will replace
retribution and government-endorsed hate238 as our fundamental principle
of justice.239 How might criminal justice practices be different in such a
“brain-compatible system [that] prizes fairness and long-term crime
prevention over harsh but inconsequential punishment”?240
Obviously, if the retributive rationale for punishing presupposes
mental causation as the basis for blame, then dissolving the mentalcausation creed would leave retribution as “the mere addition of a second
evil” to the one that has already happened.241 It would no longer make
moral sense. Unless some other basis could be found for concluding that
offenders “deserve” to suffer (based, perhaps, on faulty empirical
character242 or low “virtue”243), continued inflictions of hardship and
deprivation in the name of retribution would be bereft of their factual
underpinnings and have to be seen as flatly immoral.
The utilitarian rationales for punishment (e.g., to deter, to incapacitate
or to rehabilitate) would probably not, as a practical matter, fare much
better. It is true that discrediting mental causation would not affect the
applicability of the basic utilitarian rationale for punishment, namely, that
inflictions are morally justified as long as they produce benefits to others
that outweigh the detriments to those afflicted: The ends, as it were, justify

236.
237.
238.

Making people suffer in order to appease others who want the suffering to be inflicted.
Injure no one.
For a rare honest acknowledgement, see 2 JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE
CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 81 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2014) (1883) (“The criminal law thus
proceeds upon the principle that it is morally right to hate criminals, and it confirms and justifies that
sentiment by inflicting up on criminals punishments which express it”).
239. ARTHUR SCHOPENHAUER, ON THE BASIS OF MORALITY 149 (Eric. F.J. Payne, trans. 1995)
[hereinafter SCHOPENHAUER, ON THE BASIS]; see also SCHOPENHAUER, THE WORLD, supra note 171,
at 343 (“[T]o diminish the suffering spread over all . . . the best and only means [is] to spare all men
the pain of suffering wrong by all men's renouncing the pleasure to be obtained from doing wrong”).
240. David M Eagleman and Sarah Isgur Flores, Defining a Neurocompatibility Index for
Criminal Justice Systems: A Framework To Align Social Policy With Modern Brain Science, in LAW
OF THE FUTURE 161–72 (2012).
241. SCHOPENHAUER, THE WORLD, supra note 171, at 350.
242. Cf. ARTHUR SCHOPENHAUER, PRIZE ESSAY ON THE FREEDOM OF THE WILL 86 (Eric. F.J.
Payne, trans. 1999).
243. I have written about this general possibility in a working paper entitled Free Will Ideology
(2010), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1578445.
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the means. But even though utilitarianism’s goal-driven justifications for
punishment can be served irrespective of blame or just deserts, there is
reason to think that most punishment-utilitarians in real life tacitly assume
that it is unjust to punish the innocent.
There is, after all, something prima facie dubious about the idea that it
is morally acceptable for people “to use another’s suffering as a means to
the attainment of [their] ends.”244 Few would agree, I think, that it is fine
to torment Alice just because Ray and his friends will benefit to an even
greater degree. More to the point, it is seldom heard that governments
should punish the blameless in order to prevent harms to other innocents,
for example, by afflicting the families of offenders with a view to
deterring the offenders themselves.245 And if benefit to others could justify
punishment even in the absence of desert, a committed utilitarian should
not care whether criminal trials are fair in their determinations of guilt, or
even try to be. All that should matter to the committed utilitarian is that
trials do a good job of estimating how much net benefit others will receive
if the government subjects the defendant to punishment. It is, however, a
rare utilitarian who argues that it is pointless to make criminal trials fair
and that the law should concentrate instead on maximizing overall utility.
In short, even if punishment is meant for the greater good of others, few
are so committed to utilitarian ideals that they would inflict it on those
who do not somehow “deserve” it. And to the extent that real-life
utilitarians tacitly fall back on the notion that punishment must be reserved
for the guilty, the cloud that neuroscience casts on mental causation should
seriously compromise the utilitarian case for punishing anyone at all.246
Still, there are other facts that cannot be ignored. First and foremost,
there is the fact that every society contains individuals whose behavioral

244. SCHOPENHAUER, ON THE BASIS, supra note 239, at 149.
245. Such derivative or vicarious punishments are certainly not unheard of. See e.g., NUM
14:18 (New International Version) (The Lord “does not leave the guilty unpunished; he punishes the
children for the sin of the parents to the third and fourth generation”); Prisons of North Korea - Camp
14 Kaechon, U.S. DEPT. OF STATE BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY HUMAN RIGHTS AND LABOR (2017),
https://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/fs/2017/273647.htm. And, indeed, imposing punishment on offenders’
families may be the only effective way to deter certain crimes, such as suicide attacks or defections to
the enemy. See Anna Ahronheim, IDF Destroys Homes Of Four, JERUSALEM POST
(Aug. 10, 2017), http://www.jpost.com/Arab-Israeli-Conflict/IDF-destroys-homes-of-fourPalestinians-responsible-for-deadly-terror-attacks-502062.
However, the United States Constitution arguably disallows such third-party punishment under
the rule that forbids punishing any person who neither pleads guilty nor is proved guilty of a crime
beyond a reasonable. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
246. In any case, I seriously doubt whether, when it comes to punishment at least, most
ordinary people are actually utilitarians anyway. That is to say, I do not think most people really care
too much whether the benefits of punishment exceed the costs, or vice versa, as long as the costs are
mostly borne by somebody other than themselves (such as offenders and their families). They just
want to be protected from crime.
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dispositions pose unreasonable risks of harm and danger to others.247
Moreover, given that most people have powers of self-control, in varying
degrees, lawmakers would be seriously remiss if they did not design the
law to make the most of these powers with a view to minimizing harms.248
Nothing contained in the neuroscience explanation of human behavior
denies these truths. Nor does anything in neuroscience deny that coercive
intervention is sometimes necessary to prevent or minimize risks and
harms249—not merely as a conventional moral imperative but as a central
part of the state’s raison d’etre.250 I would certainly want and expect the
state to intervene coercively to protect me and my family from hardship or
deprivation at the hands of dangerous others who would inflict it, and I am
confident that most would agree. But it does not follow that the people
who must be coerced by the state in the interest of public safety morally
“deserve” such treatment. Even though suffering and adversity are
inseparable from reducing behavioral risks of harm to reasonable levels, it
does not follow that any person should suffer more than necessary to
achieve this goal.251
If retribution and utilitarian goals do not justify the suffering that is
inseparable from coercive force for public protection, what does? How can
one justify such suffering cast on risky or dangerous individuals if it is not
deserved? While it is not the ambition of this article to lay down a
definitive moral foundation for the coercive treatment of dangerous
individuals or suggest new models of societal protection to replace
traditional “punishment,” I also do not want to leave the impression that
no possibilities exist. Accordingly, let me offer the following example of a
justification for coercive treatment that is not based on a presupposition of
just deserts.

247. That is to say, individuals whose brains (patterns of synaptic strengths) have been
modified by past experiences in interaction with their genetic and developmental endowments, in such
a way that they have become exceptionally disposed to respond to certain combinations of external
circumstances and other extra-cerebral factors in ways that pose unreasonably high risks of danger to
the interests of others. (For this purpose, “unreasonably high” is understood to mean so unusually high
as to be too socially intolerable to allow—determined as a matter of public policy in accordance with
law.)
248. See Patricia Churchland, The Big Questions: Do We Have Free Will?, NEW SCIENTIST 42
(Nov. 2006).
249. See, e.g., Robert M. Sapolsky, The Frontal Cortex In The Criminal Justice System, 359
PHIL. TRANS. ROYAL SOCIETY BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES 1787 (2004) (“[Y]ou do not ponder whether to
forgive a car that, because of problems with its brakes, has injured someone, [but] you nevertheless
protect society from it”).
250. See U.S. CONST. pmbl. (“[I]n order to . . . establish justice, insure domestic tranquility”).
251. The more fundamental principle is equality—that that every person is equally morally
deserving of decent treatment and respect, there being no normative basis (absent mental causation) to
hold any person more (or less) morally deserving than any other.
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My example of a morally defensible theory for justification of
coercive force starts from the fundamental principle closely resembling
that which underlies private self-defense,252 namely: “[W]hat is done
simply in order not to suffer any wrong is not wrongdoing.”253 To
elaborate at bit, since it is wrong to harm or threaten harm to others by
violence or cunning, no one has a right to do so. Therefore, to “resist” such
encroachments254 by “warding [them] off cannot itself be wrong” even
though “violent action committed in connection with it.”255 Warding off is
“justified . . . by its motive.”256 To wrongfully encroach on the “sphere” of
another by violence or cunning is a denial of the other’s equality, so
warding off that encroachment is only the denial of that denial.257 And one
has “a right to deny that other person’s denial with what force is necessary
to suppress it.”258 The force used in warding off or resisting another may
permissibly exceed the force used in the original encroachment,259 but
there is a built-in limit: If the force used against an encroacher exceeds
that which is necessary for warding off, the excess would it would be a
wrongful encroachment on the original encroacher. Uses of force that
“transgress this limit, [are] consequently wrong, and [they] can therefore
in turn be warded off without wrong.”260

252. See Gregg D. Caruso, Free Will Skepticism and Criminal Behavior: A Public HealthQuarantine Model, 32 S.W. PHIL REV. 25, 28–31 (2016); Derk Pereboom, Free Will Skepticism and
Criminal Punishment, in THE FUTURE OF PUNISHMENT 49 (Thomas Nadelhoffer, ed. 2013). While I
think the analogy of self-defense is very illuminating, my reason for seeking the principle underlying
self-defense rather than invoking self-defense itself is that self-defense as practiced is not a “moral
primitive” (an irreducible principle needing no further explanation) but a constructed contingent right
that depends on factors, such as imminency and freedom from fault, that are probably germane to the
protection of public safety. See United States v. Peterson, 483 F.2d 1222 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
253. SCHOPENHAUER, THE WORLD, supra note 171, at 342; see generally id. at §62, especially
339–42. In the passage that follows, my borrowing from Schopenhauer, who wrote over 150 years ago,
is selective and it does not mean that I necessarily buy into a number of his related views concerning
punishment, such as his contractarianism, e.g., id. at 347–349, or his view that the “object of
punishment . . . is deterrence.” While I think that the latter reflects a well-motivated rejection of
retribution (calling it “wickedness and cruelty [that] cannot be ethically justified”, id. at 348), it seems
to me that general deterrence is also hard to justify if offenders cannot be shown to “deserve”
suffering, and special deterrence would go beyond the “need to ward off” described in the text unless
it is limited to mild disincentivizing or, perhaps, as a last resort when less encroaching measures would
be ineffective.
254. SCHOPENHAUER, ON THE BASIS, supra note 239, at 154.
255. Id.; SCHOPENHAUER, THE WORLD, supra note 171, at 339.
256. SCHOPENHAUER, THE WORLD, supra note 171, at 339.
257. Id. at 339–40. I have avoided Schopenhauer’s references to the metaphysical “will”
because inclusion would likely be confusing for those unfamiliar with his overall system. I believe,
however, the resulting paraphrase is faithful to his meaning.
258. Id. at 340 (emphasis in original). Schopenhauer specifies that cunning may also be used to
oppose another’s violence—so-called “white lies.”
259. Id.
260. Id. at 340.
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That’s the principle: that it is not wrong to ward off wrong. Obviously,
it is not meant as an answer all moral questions261 but is suggested here as
an example of a moral kernel for a theory of coercion can take the place of
retribution and deterrence as a justification for public coercion—one that
does not depend, openly or tacitly, on putative “just deserts.” And that is
its virtue. Even though governments sometimes still would have to treat
people coercively, abandoning the thesis that some people actually
“deserve” hard treatment, because of their mental states, should make an
enormous difference in punishment practices.
To be sure, imprisonment facilities would surely still need to exist, for
incapacitation and its incidental deterrent effects as well as places for
rehabilitation.262 But the mission of such facilities and, indeed, of the
whole criminal justice system would be crime-prevention, not punishment.
Actual incarceration would be treated as a last resort not the default
response263 and, most importantly, facilities would be designed to
minimize rather than to accentuate the inevitable hardship and deprivation

261. Of particular importance, it elides the question of how the putative equality of a state of
nature can be affected as duly constituted governments make laws, such as laws authorizing
acquisition and control of tangible things and intangible values (property), which can radically change
scopes of protected “spheres” and, hence, the line between right and wrong. This is not the place for
such a discussion because questions of appropriate law enforcement and punishment presuppose the
existence of norms to be enforced. I will only note that, in general, laws dealing with protection of the
person support and further equality while those that protect property generally have the opposite effect,
creating and maintaining inequality—though for purposes that are arguably sufficient to make them
just. Laws that prescribe the disposition of offenders are, however, exceptions to this distinction:
Although they are laws that deal with protection of the person, they generally operate by reducing the
protection afforded to other persons (VNC transgressors) and, thus their immediate effect is to increase
inequality.
262. There is evidence that imprisonment reduces recidivism, but only if it “increases
participation in programs directed at improving employability and reducing recidivism,” whereas for
those who already have positive employment histories, imprisonment tends to increase recidivism. See
Manudeep Bhuller et al., Incarceration, Recidivism, and Employment, NHH Dept. of
Economics Discussion Paper No. 14/2018 (2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id
=3205006. In the United States, however, prison generally decreases employability. See John Schmitt
& Kris Warner, Center for Economic and Policy Research, Ex-Offenders and the Labor Market, 12-13
(2010), http://www.cepr.net/documents/publications/ex-offenders-2010-11.pdf; Steven Raphael, The
Employment Prospects of Ex-Offenders, 25 FOCUS 21 (2007), http://www.irp.wisc.edu/publications/
focus/pdfs/foc252d.pdf; Bruce Western, The Impact of Incarceration on Wage Mobility and Inequality
67 AM. SOC. REV. 526 (2002), http://scholar.harvard.edu/files/brucewestern/files/western_asr.pdf.
No position is taken here on the justifiability of rehabilitative interventions by the state,
especially neuro-interventions, designed to change aspects of a person’s personality against her will.
See Christoph Bublitz, “The Soul is the Prison of the Body”—Mandatory Moral Enhancement,
Punishment & Rights against Neuro-Rehabilitation, in TREATMENT FOR CRIME: PHILOSOPHICAL
ESSAYS ON NEUROINTERVENTIONS IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE (David Birks & Thomas Douglas, eds.,
2017). I would, however, agree there is no moral right to pose an unreasonable risk of harm to others.
263. Judges in the Netherlands, by using “alternatives to prison such as community service
orders, fines and electronic tagging of offenders,” have contributed to a forty-three percent reduction
in the number of people incarcerated over a period of about ten years. See Lucy Ash, The Dutch Prison
Crisis: A Shortage of Prisoners, BBC NEWS (Nov. 10, 2016), http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine37904263.
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that comes with loss of freedom for the protection of others.264 A high
priority would be placed on discovering and implementing innovative
technologies that can mitigate the risks to others posed by convicted
VNCs265 whose behavior is predictably dangerous.266 Contrary to popular
mythology, comfortable conditions of confinement do not mean that
confinement loses its deterrent effects. Norway probably has the cushiest
prisons in the world267 but one of the lowest rates of recidivism, vastly
lower than the United States (20% vs. 76.6%).268 This may not prove that
comfortable confinement reduces reoffending, but it surely is evidence

264. By contrast, infliction of gratuitous hardship on prisoner and their families sometimes
seems to be a deliberate feature of the American justice system. See, e.g., Lorelei Laird, Appeals Court
Stymies Bid to Regulate High Cost of Prison Phone Calls, A.B.A.J. ONLINE (May 2018),
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/regulate_price_prison_phone_calls; Shannon Sims, The
End of American Prison Visits: Jails End Face-To-Face Contact—and Families Suffer, THE
GUARDIAN (Dec 9. 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/dec/09/skype-for-jailed-videocalls-prisons-replace-in-person-visits; see also Judith Miller’s grim description of life for civil
detainees in the Alexandria Detention Center, surely far from one of the worst, recounted in her book
THE STORY: A REPORTER’S JOURNEY (2015), quoted at length in Darren Samuelsohn, Prison Jumpsuit
and Mystery Meats: Inside Manafort’s New Jail Experience, POLITICO (July 12, 2018, 6:09 PM),
https://www.politico.com/story/2018/07/12/manafort-jail-conditions-northern-virginia-mueller-probe716841available. No one who sees value or merit in the decent treatment of others can help but be
appalled by the deliberate and calculated unpleasantness that the detention center cast into every aspect
of the daily lives of the people in its charge (food, bedding, lighting, enforced loneliness and close
confinement) and yet, it is a facility for people who have not even been convicted of a crime. One has
to ask the question: What is the purpose of prison? To keep people secure (public safety) or to keep
people uncomfortable.
265. See supra Part II.B. Note the word “convicted.” I do not believe that, on the current state
of the science, the prediction of criminal acts by people never before convicted is anywhere near
accurate enough to justify coercive treatment.
266. I. Bennett Capers, Techno-Policing, 15 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 495.
267. Anders Breivik: Just How Cushy are Norwegian Prisons? BBC NEWS (March 16, 2016),
http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-35813470 [hereinafter Anders Breivik]; Christina Sterbenz, Why
Norway's Prison System is So Successful, BUSINESS INSIDER (Dec. 11, 2014, 1:31 PM),
https://www.businessinsider.com/why-norways-prison-system-is-so-successful-2014-12; Erwin James,
Bastoy: The Norwegian Prison That Works, THE GUARDIAN (Sept. 4, 2013, 11:32 AM),
https://www.theguardian.com/society/2013/sep/04/bastoy-norwegian-prison-works; Norwegian
Ministry of Justice & Police, PUNISHMENT THAT WORKS (2008); NORWEGIAN CORRECTIONAL SYST.
OPERATIONS STRATEGY, http://www.kriminalomsorgen.no/getfile.php/2766216.823.fvprryqpxf/Opera
tions+Strategy+2014-2018.pdf.
268. Anders Breivik, supra note 267 (“According to the Directorate of Norwegian Correctional
Service, prison should be a restriction of liberty, but nothing more”). Cf. Recidivism, Office of Justice
Programs, National Institute of Justice, https://www.nij.gov/topics/corrections/recidivism/pages/welco
me.aspx. It has been recently argued that recidivism “is not a comprehensive measure of success for
criminal justice in general or for community corrections specifically.” Jeffrey A. Butts & Vincent
Schiraldi, Recidivism Reconsidered: Preserving the Community Justice Mission of Community
Corrections 2, Harvard Kennedy School (Mar. 2018), https://www.hks.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/c
enters/wiener/programs/pcj/files/recidivism_reconsidered.pdf. Perhaps. But they are a good measure of
the effects of correctional institutions on rates of victimization by prior offenders, and anyone who
wants to see the rates of crime victimization go down must surely be interested in the effects of
criminal justice processes on recidivism.
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that it does not increase it.269 We should strive to make our prisons more
like Norway’s, and less like North Korea’s.
Even apart from the findings of neuroscience, however, there is ample
reason to suspect that our nation needs a fundamental rethinking of its
criminal justice system. The nation has literally become “addicted to
incarceration.”270 With a quarter of American adults already having a
criminal record and 1,000,000 million felony convictions per year (one
every 30 seconds),271 we are well on our way to becoming a nation of excons.272 As a result of burgeoning “collateral consequences” and the
lifetime legal disabilities they impose, we are creating within our society a
huge new class of second-class citizens who are shunned by employers273
and deprived by the law274 of the normal benefits of citizenship. That it
would not be a good thing for the country to become a legally divided
two-class society, with a huge underclass having an inferior set of civic
rights and benefits, is hardly a matter for debate. One does not make a
nation stronger by making its citizens weaker, economically and
otherwise. A nation does not strengthen the well-being and dignity of its
people as a whole by purposely inflicting major suffering and deprivation
on an enormous and growing minority.
There are, no doubt, many reasons for America’s criminal justice
pathologies, but surely important among them is a widely shared
commitment to the belief that blame, accountability and just deserts are
immutable facts about the world rather than the social constructs that they
are. To the extent that accountability and just deserts are thought proper
because people’s conduct is controlled by their intentions, reasons and
other mental states, the mental causation hypothesis (that is embedded in

269.
See generally, Rebecca Beyer, Model Prisons, A.B.A. J. (May. 2018), http://www.abajournal.com/mag
azine/article/regulate_price_prison_phone_calls; Chantal Da Silva, New York Prisons Impose
‘Draconian’ Rules Limiting Books Inmates Can Read To ‘Sex Novels, Bibles And Coloring Books,’
NEWSWEEK (Jan. 9, 2018), http://www.newsweek.com/new-york-prisons-impose-draconinan-ruleslimiting-books-inmates-can-read-sex-775708.
270. Mark W. Bennett, Addicted to Incarceration: A Federal Judge Reveals Shocking Truths
About Federal Sentencing and Fleeting Hopes for Reform, 87 UMKC L. REV. 3 (2018).
271. Humbach, supra note 226, at 606.
272. Id. at 605–09.
273. Id. at 608–09; see Kai Wright, Boxed in: How a Criminal Record Keeps Americans
Jobless for Life, THE NATION (Nov. 25, 2013), http://www.thenation.com/article/177017/boxed-howcriminal-record-keeps-you-unemployed-life#.
274. The growing assortment of law-prescribed “collateral consequences” to conviction now
number in the tens of thousands. ABA Voices Concerns About the Impact of Over-Criminalization of
U.S. Laws, ABA J. (Dec. 1, 2014), http://www.abajournal.com/mobile/mag_article/aba_voices_concer
ns_about_the_impact_of_over_criminalization_of_us_laws (referencing National Inventory of the
Collateral Consequences of Conviction, http://www.abacollateralconsequences.org (last visited Mar.
23, 2015)). See generally Jenny Roberts, Why Misdemeanors Matter, 45 U. C. DAVIS L. REV. 277
(2011).
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the neuronal representation of reality of so many) is a core factor in
sustaining the present exorbitance of convictions and imprisonment. To
the extent, therefore that the findings of neuroscience can offer path to
extirpate neuronally-embedded “beliefs” about mental causation and
mitigate their contribution to criminal justice decision-making, the
criminal justice system will be able to shake off its fixation on dealing
with “guilt” and fulfill instead its socially indispensable role of protecting
the people.
CONCLUSION
Mental causation plays an important part in the logic that justifies
purposely inflicting hardship and deprivation on human beings. That being
so, the epistemic case for its actual existence should be very strong. It is
not. Indeed, the case is practically non-existent and, at best, it very far
from being the best explanation of the totality of evidence and data that we
have today as to the causes of human behavior. It matters when
government purposely inflicts suffering on people who do not “deserve” it,
and if mental causation is the basis for just deserts, then the doubt that
neuroscience throws on mental causation is a cloud on the entire criminal
justice system.
No one questions that coercive measures are sometimes needed for the
sake of public safety, but the occasions and nature of these measures
would be entirely different if their basis could be purged of vestigial
emotions like blame and the urge to retribution. Every society has crime,
but only ours has managed to attach the lifetime-label of “criminal” and
“ex-convict” to 25% of its adult population. If that is not a sign and
warning that something is seriously amiss in the nation’s social health, it is
hard to know what would be.
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